

# SOCIAL RESEARCH

AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY  
OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

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# Social Research

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*October 1957*

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# SOVIET SOCIAL SCIENCE AND OUR OWN

BY ARVID BRODERSEN

WESTERN observers have recently expressed urgent concern over a new and to most people unexpected challenge from the Soviet Union: its mighty forward stride in science and technology. "Russia is turning out two scientists to our one, two engineers to our one, in ten years it will be four to one" (Dr. Alvin Johnson), and "Ten years from now the best scientists in the world will be found in Russia" (Dr. Edward Teller)—these are representative comments.

A considerable amount of research has been devoted to the situation of the natural and technological sciences in the Soviet Union, but the social sciences, hardly a less important subject, have received less attention from students in the West. The present paper, based exclusively on Western sources, cannot pretend to fill this gap. It can offer only a preliminary exposition of the problem, as far as this is within the field of vision of one who is not a Russian scholar, and it can perhaps identify some areas in particular need of research.<sup>1</sup>

## *Social vs. Natural Science in Soviet Higher Education*

Soviet higher education, generally speaking, offers vocational training keyed to a large number of specific occupations in in-

<sup>1</sup> The principal sources used in this paper are: Nicholas DeWitt, *Soviet Professional Manpower*, published by the National Science Foundation (Washington 1955) and referred to here as DeWitt (although primarily devoted to manpower problems in the natural and applied sciences, this study also contains valuable information on the situation of the social sciences in the Soviet Union); "The Social Sciences in the USSR," a special issue, no. 10 (November 1956), of the periodical *Soviet Survey*, published by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, London, and referred to here as *Soviet Survey*; Max Gustav Lange, *Wissenschaft im totalitären Staat* (Stuttgart and Düsseldorf 1955), referred to as Lange (this study indirectly sheds new light on the present problem by examining in detail the Sovietization of the social sciences in the East Zone of Germany). References to other sources are given in full in the text.

dustry, agriculture, administration, and society at large. This is true of the universities as well as of the many hundreds of specialized institutes of education in the Soviet Union. University students are not, as in the West, educated for general culture, for personality development, for "getting along with other people," or for intellectual leadership in general. They are to become workers, in the sense of technicians mastering a specific job and functionaries serving the state. For this the individual student is trained intensively in his own chosen or assigned discipline, and this latter often covers a far more limited and specialized field than would typically be the case in the West, particularly in Europe. Thus there seem to be no institutes of technology as we know them, teaching technological subjects in general. Instead, the Soviet system provides a large number of institutes for single subjects, such as communications, light metals, electrical engineering, and the like.

For the vocational training intended to produce technicians for the various higher functions in industry, agriculture, and the health services the Soviet policymakers apparently see no need to spend much time on extraneous subjects. The curricula of study leading into these three professions provide far less time for topics from the social sciences (6 to 8 percent of the total) than do the corresponding curricula in the Western system (12 to 15 percent). Apart from this quantitative difference there are also, of course, important differences in the kind and quality of offerings in these fields, but this matter I shall discuss later.

The three professional groups I have mentioned (engineering, agricultural science, and medicine) account for over half, 52 percent, of the total professional manpower available in the Soviet Union (1954). The other, smaller half is made up of two groups, the teaching profession, which is by far the largest of them all, 42 percent, and the one referred to as the "socio-economic" profession, which is the smallest of them all, 6 percent (DeWitt, p. 239). By their very nature and their functions in society these two groups are likely, under any system, to receive considerably more social-

science training than the other professions just referred to. Thus for Soviet teachers the program of general subjects, mostly political indoctrination (DeWitt, p. 134), takes up to 20 percent, or more than twice the maximum time devoted to these subjects in the technological or medical schools. More significant, a sizable proportion of the student body, both at the universities and at the teachers' institutes, take social or humanistic disciplines as major subjects of study (DeWitt, pp. 225, 114, 224 note, and 350).

Soviet universities, numbering at present thirty-three, typically have six divisions or faculties: physical and mathematical sciences, philology, history, geography, biology, and chemistry. In addition some of them have separate faculties in jurisprudence, economics, and "Eastern and Pacific cultures" (DeWitt, p. 89).

Of the total class of about 18,000 students leaving Soviet universities in 1954, as many as 55 to 60 percent were graduated with a major in a subject other than natural science (DeWitt, p. 114). Among these majors, however, the proportion of social-science subjects, properly speaking, appears to be relatively small, since philology (Russian and foreign languages and literature) probably accounts for more than half the total, while the remainder is divided between such subjects as political science and philosophy, economics, history, geography, and jurisprudence, to name them in order of decreasing frequency. This is suggested by the information available on the relative proportions of subjects for the "aspirantura" examination and for dissertations (DeWitt, p. 209).

Of the university graduates in human and social sciences, about 50 percent enter the teaching profession, by way of which some of them may join the ranks of what we would call professional social scientists, combining, more or less, research and writing with their principal activity of teaching. Very few indeed are likely to make social-science research their principal work and full-time activity. University graduates in the non-natural sciences, if they do not go into teaching, are likely to be employed as interpreters, translators, journalists, or in other intellectual jobs of a practical kind in government enterprises. Facilities for

pure research in the social sciences, apart from teaching or other applied fields, are extremely scarce in the Soviet Union.

By far the main supply of teachers comes from the many specialized training centers—the pedagogical institutes, teachers' institutes, foreign-language institutes, institutes for librarians, archivists, and the like. Of about 70,000 new teachers who were graduated in 1954, these institutes supplied 65,000, with only about 5,000 coming from the universities. Usually about half of these institute graduates have majored in mathematics and natural sciences, the other half majoring in a variety of other subjects in which, again, the share of the social sciences proper is modest, the preponderant emphasis going to such subject matters as philology, librarianship, and archival science, and also to the theory and methodology of education (pedagogy).

The other main professional group where we would naturally look for a considerable training in, and concern with, social-science subjects is the socio-economic profession. As I have mentioned, this group is numerically far smaller, comprising in 1954 a total of 125,000 individuals, or about 6 percent of the total professional labor force. In comparison, teaching and engineering accounted in that year for 857,000 and 541,000 professionals, respectively. While the large majority of this group is trained for technical jobs as accountants or statistical or archival experts, a minority is educated for higher-level activities in such fields as banking, trade and distribution, jurisprudence, planning, and economic management. The main burden of training students for the socio-economic profession is carried by about 35 institutes of higher education, of which 9 specialize in planning and managerial economics, 9 in finance, 5 in trade, 3 in industrial, technical, and engineering economics, and 9 in jurisprudence (DeWitt, p. 92). Again the Soviet Union does not seem to have the type of single institution which, like our schools of business administration, covers more or less the entire range of socio-economic disciplines in a comprehensive, articulated program. Nor do these disciplines occupy more than a modest place in

Soviet universities; for example, only 8 out of the 33 universities have a faculty of economics (DeWitt, p. 89).

To sum up the situation in global figures, it appears that the ratio of professionally skilled manpower produced year by year by Soviet higher education in the natural and applied sciences, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, in the humanities and social sciences, pure and applied, is in the order of 70-75 percent to 25-30 percent, while in the United States the comparable figures are in the order of 30-35 percent to 65-70 percent, that is, much the same in reverse (DeWitt, p. 169). As far as the social sciences proper are concerned, this justifies DeWitt in stating that "the Soviet Union trained only about one-tenth as many persons as were trained in these fields in the United States"; and similarly, "In the humanities, liberal arts and other non-specialized fields, Soviet higher education trained but a small fraction of the number of persons trained in American colleges and universities in these fields" (p. 225; cf. pp. 255 ff.).

Figures alone do not, however, tell the full story. Far more important are the qualitative aspects, both generally, in the selection of personnel (teachers and students) and the standards of teaching and research, and, more specifically, in the types and content of the material handled. In the field of natural and applied sciences, qualitative comparison between Soviet and Western performance has been a subject of keen interest and considerable study in recent years, particularly in the United States and Britain. The DeWitt report devotes most of its space to this problem.

In general the picture looks somewhat like this. Soviet science and technology compare favorably with their Western counterparts in the selection of the students and in their secondary-level preparation in basic science, mathematics, and foreign languages. The training and quality of teachers are probably not inferior to the average in the West. Standards and methods of teaching, though in certain respects somewhat inferior to those in the United States, especially in availability of instruments and of

teaching equipment, are in other respects superior to the West, as in methods for training in mathematics. On balance, it seems that Soviet science and technology compete with those of the West on about an even level, as far as general quality goes. And also in the matter of specific quality, that is, the types and content of materials that are treated in teaching and study, Soviet science and technology are substantially similar to their Western counterparts, and in fact are, to a large extent, operating with knowledge of Western performance and attempting to match or emulate it. The Western scientific literature is widely read, in the original or in translations, and there is an abstracting service in Russian, covering almost 7,000 foreign scientific periodicals and reporting regularly on the current production in such fields as mathematics, mechanics, astronomy, geodesy, physics, chemistry, biology, machine building, electrical engineering (DeWitt, p. 149 note).

There are two notable exceptions to this basic similarity or near-identity in content. One, which is a difference in emphasis and specialization, reflects the differences of Soviet from Western society, particularly American, in economic structure and development. The other is a substantive difference in scientific theory itself, and is far the most important and most commonly noted qualitative difference between Soviet science and our own. The Lysenko doctrine is its *cause célèbre*.

That particular deviation from well established theory, with its assumption that even the genes, the foundations of living nature, are subject to willful manipulations by the state through science, caused considerable deterioration in certain areas of Soviet science. It should be noted, on the other hand, that these areas—mainly genetics, in part agricultural biology and biochemistry—although they are extremely important, do not by any means include all of the scientific disciplines. The extent of the damage was therefore far from total. Luckily it was also of limited duration. With the demise of Mr. Lysenko, after Stalin's death, Soviet biology was free to go back to normal and again share the basic theory of genetics.

At present there remains scarcely any difference of major intellectual or theoretic importance between Soviet natural science and our own. Thus, for instance, Dr. G. E. Brown, of the University of Birmingham, in a paper dealing with the discussion on physics in the Soviet Union, makes the following observation (*Soviet Studies*, vol. 6, 1954-55, p. 132; italics mine): "Radically different results and theories from those in Western physics . . . have fallen into disrepute and are no longer believed in the U.S.S.R. *Physical theories and physical laws have been international* in this period" (that is, during the past thirty years).

The picture changes, however, when we consider Soviet social science, for this is in a category qualitatively different from that of the natural and applied sciences, East and West, as well as from Western social science. This is particularly striking in regard to specific and substantive quality.

The situation with respect to general quality is more difficult to evaluate with certainty. In regard to the recruitment, selection, and training of Soviet social scientists there is, to my knowledge, no material available like the Sibley Report published by the American Social Science Research Council in 1948, analyzing problems pertaining to the general quality of United States social scientists. On indirect evidence, however, it seems hardly an unfair assumption that the best academic talent in the Soviet Union is channeled or attracted into natural science and related applied fields, rather than into human and social science. In the latter fields, also the quality of the training seems inferior to that in the former, if availability of training materials such as textbooks is a valid criterion. In the list of Soviet textbooks published between 1938 and 1948, the distribution by fields is shown for a total of 2,165 books. Of these, 1,835 were in natural and applied sciences, and only 330 in human and social sciences. Of the latter, 132 were in finance and economics, 113 in foreign languages, leaving only 85 to be distributed as follows: pedagogy 32; history 32; geography 17; and philosophy 4. An indication of the comparative standards of learning and research may be seen also in the



availability of the aforementioned abstracts in many scientific and technical fields, and their absence in the humanities and social sciences.

Obviously far more important, as well as more easily documented, are the specific and substantive quality differences, involving the types and content of material treated in Soviet social science as compared with our own. Here the differences are substantial, even though most of the disciplines taught and studied in the West have their opposite numbers in Soviet social science. Among the total of eighteen major areas of learning officially recognized as fields of specialization for the advanced degrees (doctorate and "candidatura"), five social-science disciplines are listed: economics, history, jurisprudence, geography, political science (including general philosophy).

Sociology does not exist as a separate discipline, but the implication of this is not immediately evident, since sociology is still quite unevenly and inadequately represented in many countries of the West, and since in Soviet social science, as often in our own, it may be present more or less incognito, included in or subsumed under kindred disciplines like economics, philosophy, ethnology, or even geography. Further reflection indicates, however, that the absence of sociology as a separate discipline, in a system otherwise given to almost excessive specialization, can be no mere accident. This was demonstrated when the chair of sociology at Moscow University, established in 1919, was abandoned in 1924 (*Soviet Survey*, p. 6), and more recently, in the Soviet zone of Germany, when in the process of *Gleichschaltung* of universities and other institutions of higher learning to bring them into line with the Soviet Russian system, all existing chairs of sociology were either abandoned or converted into chairs of dialectical materialism, Marxism-Leninism, or recent history (Lange, pp. 99 note, 104 note). Considered primarily a political discipline, this subject matter has been carefully removed from the context of Soviet academic life and placed under direct party supervision (*Soviet Survey*, p. 6).



We shall presently examine further the situation of sociology, but let us now turn again to the officially recognized social-science disciplines, and consider their relative quantitative importance as academic subjects. A general criterion to go by here is the number of completed study careers, that is, final examinations absolved and academic dissertations defended. On the basis of figures reported by DeWitt (p. 209) the proportions for each of these disciplines—in relation to the total for all fields—appear to be as follows, for the periods 1925-46 (examinations) and 1934-46 (theses):

	<i>Examinations</i>	<i>Theses</i>
Political science and philosophy	5.1%	2.9%
Economics	3.0	2.9
History	2.7	2.5
Geography	1.1	1.1
Jurisprudence	.6	.5
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	12.5	9.9

This picture checks only in part with the figures previously noted regarding textbooks. The discrepancy between the prominence of political science and philosophy, as shown here, and the absence of special textbooks in political science and their scarcity in philosophy may be explained, however, by the fact that the abundant party literature on Marxism-Leninism serves as textbook material for students in these disciplines. The textbook figures for history and geography are approximately in line with the relative importance of these subjects in terms of reported examinations and dissertations. The general order of magnitude for the five disciplines taken together is evident from the fact that their combined proportions are considerably lower than the individual figures for such disciplines as philology (19.4 and 11.4 percent), medicine (16.5 and 16.5), and engineering (15 and 20.8).

The prominent position of philology, evident throughout the educational system of the Soviet Union, is explained by the plural-

ism of languages existing inside the Union and the sphere of Soviet power as well as outside them, in the worldwide areas of communist penetration and propaganda. The communication problems of the Soviet Union and of world communism are formidable. Wherever the Soviets are masters they drive for the adoption of Russian as a common language, by making it a compulsory major subject of instruction. At the same time they need a large number of specialists in other languages. It is hardly an accident that Stalin himself devoted an important political and ideological statement to the subject of linguistics (discussed on a later page).

A few remarks are needed also on the organization and content of Soviet university and other higher education, particularly in the social sciences. Generally, the total period required to complete a program of study for a diploma at a university or institute varies from three or four to six years. The academic year lasts ten months (September 1 to July 1), and the number of instruction hours ranges from 32 to 40 per six-day week (with attendance compulsory), which is about twice the average in the United States system (DeWitt, p. 115). The programs of study provide for a high degree of specialization, offering choices among a large number of major subjects. In addition, certain recurrent items are included in every social-science program, regardless of specialization: a basic course in political subjects or Marxism-Leninism; introductory courses in mathematics and natural science; and courses in Russian and selected foreign languages.

As a fairly typical example of a study program leading to a specialist degree at Soviet universities we may consider the work required in economics, recently described by Professor Meek of the University of Glasgow.<sup>2</sup> The standard five-year course in economics impressed that Western observer as "extremely thorough." Its main offerings may be summarized as follows. First year: political economy of capitalism; economic geography; higher mathematics; Russian; a foreign language; "the foundations

<sup>2</sup> R. L. Meek, "Conversations with Soviet Economists," in *Soviet Studies*, vol. 6 (1954-55) pp. 238 ff.

of Marxism-Leninism." Second year: political economy of capitalism completed; political economy of socialism started; economic geography, Russian, and the foreign language continued; new course in statistics started. Third year: courses in political economy of socialism, the foreign language, and statistics completed; new courses started in history of economic thought and principles of economic planning; work begun on the student's special subject, selected from a list including such fields as industrial economics, trade, finance and credit, planning and managerial economics, statistics, economic theory. The fourth and fifth years are devoted to the special subject; a semester of reading is followed by a period of paid practical work, related to the subject, in some appropriate institution, such as the Ministry of Finance, and the final months are reserved for the writing of a thesis and advanced seminars. At the end of each course there is an oral examination of about twenty minutes, and a term paper. Comprehensive examinations occur at the end of the five-year period.

The four-year standard program in history involves first a two-year period of preparatory study in general historical subjects and the usual political, linguistic, and mathematical "must" courses. The second two years are devoted to a special subject, such as the history of slave-economy societies, history of feudalism, modern history, recent and contemporary history, history of individual peoples (according to choice), methodology of historical research. In jurisprudence there is a four-year course for specialists in Soviet law and a five-year course for those specializing in international law. The curriculum in the former includes a total of thirty-three subjects, of which two are purely political and eight general (Latin, history, foreign language, logic, and the like); the remainder, involving about 75 percent of the period of instruction, are technical law subjects (DeWitt, p. 112). The curriculum in geography includes, besides topography and physical geography, a particularly heavy component of social-science subjects, such as economic geography, demography, human resources, and even geopolitics. DeWitt notes (p. 136) that in no other field are there

so many subjects in general education; this is true if "general" is read as meaning "social science."

Finally, the crucial Soviet discipline called "politics and philosophy" is taught on two different levels: in basic courses for all students, regardless of their chosen major subjects; and in extended courses for specialists. The basic courses vary in length and scope, depending on the major subject; for engineering students they may take 6 to 8 percent of the total instruction period, for social-science students and prospective teachers as much as 20 percent. The specialized courses normally require three years of study at universities or institutes, the most prominent of which is the Academy of the Social Sciences, an institution under the immediate direction of the Central Committee of the party. The topics of instruction here include the general theory of Marxism-Leninism, as well as its applications in a number of special fields, chosen from such subjects as political economy, economics and politics of foreign countries, theory of state and law, history of the USSR, international relations, history of Russian and Western philosophy, logic, psychology.

#### *Fact vs. Doctrine*

Because of the systematic political bias in all Soviet study programs, the Western observer inevitably introduces here a distinction between fact and doctrine. In analyzing the content of Soviet social-science study programs and publications, he will grant that certain components belong in the category of fact. And this is true not only of largely descriptive disciplines, such as geography or ethnology, but also of the more interpretive, like political science and philosophy. Obviously the Soviet student, during his years of training, acquires knowledge in the technical sense, as does his Western counterpart. As to how much and what type of knowledge he acquires, I believe, though only on the basis of second-hand impressions, that the West probably underestimates the opponent in this regard: he may be better informed and know more than we think. On the other hand, however, the factual

components of Soviet social science are always treated in a context of political doctrine. Fact never stands straight and plain, but is always distorted by a biased philosophic interpretation.

In their efforts to explain the mental basis for this, some Western writers have applied analogies from religious experience, like a belief in revealed truth, obedience to spiritual authority, and communism itself has been termed religion or pseudo-religion. Whatever the usefulness of such analogies in other respects, the best key to our particular problem lies rather, I believe, in the theory of science itself, or, to be more precise, in the epistemology of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. The operative elements of that theory are, very briefly, the following. First, knowability (*Erkennbarkeit*) of the total universe (nature, society, and human mind) and of the regularities (laws) in the process of its evolution. Second, materialist realism, which views the universe as matter, and consciousness (thought, knowledge) as an *Abbild* or reflection of it in the mind. Third, pragmatism, which finds the criterion of realistically correct judgment only in the practice of socio-political action. And fourth, Sovietism; according to Marx and Marxist-Leninist theory, valid until about 1933, the chance of correct judgment (*Erkenntnis-Chance*) rests on the struggling proletariat and the Communist Party, but according to the subsequently dominant Stalinist theory it rests on the existence of the Soviet Union, whose actions and policies are now the sole criterion of scientific truth and correct judgment (see Lange for further elaboration of this last point).

The consequences of this Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist epistemology for Soviet science, both natural and social, and for Soviet education are far-reaching. First of all, in contrast to Western science and education, there can be no intellectually relevant difference between fact and doctrine; the two are identical in the correct teachings of Soviet science and education. In Western terms, doctrine is fact, and fact is doctrine. In Soviet terms, both are truth (*pravda*), and the distinction is not at all valid or necessary, as it must be under the conditions of capitalist society. And

secondly, it follows that Soviet policymakers have a responsibility, a duty, to control the operations of science, not only administratively, in the manner of some Western governments, but intellectually, by way of decision and command regarding scientific theories, the content of teaching, the priorities in research. This is a duty in the interests not only of the state and the people, but of scientific correctness and truth as such, and it applies in principle to all scientific and scholarly activities, that is, to mathematics no less than to Marxism. The workings of Soviet theory-control are by now well known through numerous studies (Ashley, Huxley, Zircle, Counts, Bauer, Moore, and others), and need no further elaboration here.

In the realm of educational techniques and practices the consequence of this epistemology is an authoritarian-disciplinarian approach to the activities of teaching, whereby factual information and political indoctrination are inseparably fused. Since it is a working assumption of the system that the truth is one and is known, the way of imparting truth to the new generation is principally by making use of the mnemonic aptitudes of the brain. This involves heavy emphasis on knowledge as acquired by learning and retaining given data, rather than by thinking as developed by the individual's free logical operations. The method relies, in other words, on conditioning and memorizing, more than on any other mental process; and a remarkable feature is that it is followed regardless of the intrinsic character of the data themselves, whether they are exact and quantitative, as in mathematics, or in the nature of purely political ideology, as in the theory of imperialism. In Western terms, one may say with equal justification that facts are being taught by methods of indoctrination, and political doctrines by methods of factual information.

It has recently been maintained that Soviet instruction in science and mathematics is superior to the Western average. A question that suggests itself is whether this superior efficiency may have one of its sources, or even its main source, in the realm of general educational philosophy, and if so, whether it is attributable to

the stricter discipline of learning, to the emphasis on memory, or to the "propaganda-type" approach to teaching, or to all of these elements of the total technique. An answer to this question would repay further study. One result of recent debate about it is another sharp revision of the West's stereotyped estimate of Soviet strength. Previously it was widely taken for granted that Soviet society, for political reasons, is poor in intellectual capabilities for both knowledge and thinking, but the assumption now is that, for similar reasons, it is rather strong in the knowledge department and weak in thinking, as compared with Western societies, notably the United States, where the reverse is believed to be true. The West assumes that its own superiority in wisdom and ideas, being a product of the free mind, is unassailable from the position of Soviet strength in information. It considers the latter an attainment it can, with effort, continually emulate. Therefore, even with the revised estimate, most Western peoples view the situation without serious concern.

The question of Soviet efficiency in social-science instruction has so far scarcely been raised in Western discussion. How much and how well do Soviet students learn in such subjects as economics, history, geography? What is the scope and volume of their knowledge here, in terms of facts and figures? How do they compare with students in the West? As I have already suggested, I suspect that we would once more do well to revise our estimate upward. I shall presently come to the problem of how political indoctrination and control affect scientific and scholarly attitudes and production, especially in the social sciences, but first a few remarks on their practical effect on political attitudes and behavior.

It has been noted by Moore, DeWitt, and others that the political instruction of natural-science professionals (engineers, agricultural scientists, physicians), which constitutes anyway only a small part of their total curriculum, is not very effective in penetration, is received "passively and mechanically," and frequently results in "outward conformity only" (DeWitt, pp. 112, 152). This is a well documented observation. One may wonder,



however, whether the actual effect of this indoctrination program is fully evaluated in these terms. Whatever the political effect, properly speaking, there is probably another effect, of value to both the state and the individual. What I mean to suggest is that the political instruction, however passively and mechanically it is received, may well have the "latent function" of training and conditioning Soviet professionals precisely in the outward conformity required for safe travel in the dangerous political landscape of that society, somewhat in the same sense as instruction in motor traffic rules is indispensable to the driver moving on our highways—as well as to the community at large.

Nor should there be a mistake about the political importance of outward conformity and passivity. Most modern regimes, and especially the totalitarian ones, feed on conformity and passivity. If by tediously repetitive "mechanical propaganda" a major part of the brains that are trained for technical skills can be rendered passive, or even cynically indifferent toward politics, "fed up" with it, so much the better for those who hold power. The more conformity, the less trouble they will have; the less independent thinking, the less risk that some of the intelligentsia will listen with interest to the voices of opposition. It is a paradox, but likely to be true, that a political indoctrination program has on many people the effect of psychological compartmentalization: it produces technicians, pure and simple, who are content to leave the business of politics to others, and therefore are that much easier to manipulate, that much more serviceable to the state. The personality type of the unpolitical expert at the core of totalitarian society is only too well known from recent history in Germany and Italy. Should anyone be surprised to meet it again in the maturing Soviet society? Even in Western democracies a certain relationship is evident, although in a different way, between conformity and power.

Nor is this all. Among the hundred thousand Soviet students at any time going through the various institutions of higher education in order to enter professional life—as engineers, doctors,



scientists, teachers, socio-economic managers, and the like—there are always some to whom the political subject matters mean a great deal more than they do to others. With them the effect of indoctrination is one of conditioning not merely for passive functioning or conformity, but for active political participation. The Soviet power apparatus needs and gets a certain current influx of new blood from among the professional intelligentsia. It is important to keep in mind, however, that, in the interest of the ruling group and the Soviet state itself, this influx must be both selective in quality and limited in number. Therefore if we find, as we do, that the politically activated professionals are a minority, this should be read not as a failure but rather as a success, and perhaps the intention of the Soviet rulers.

On this point I disagree, for once, with the judgment of DeWitt. He states, from Soviet sources, that party membership of professionals increased from about 7 percent of all professionals in 1929 to about one-third in 1947; in spite of this almost fivefold increase he finds it "surprising that in 1947, after thirty years of Communist rule in Russia, only about one-third of all professionals had been recruited into the party" (p. 244). On the contrary, it seems surprising that this stratum, which constitutes not quite eight-tenths of one percent of the nation, should have such a high representation in the party, when less than 5 percent of the total population belong to the party, and only 5 to 10 percent of the working class, allegedly the backbone of the Soviet state. The party membership itself is composed to an increasing and, by now, predominant degree of professional people. In 1925 they made up less than 10 percent of the total membership (over 78 percent being workers, over 12 percent peasants), but by 1948 they were more than 50 percent of the total, and their representation in the more influential and important brackets of the party was, and is, much higher still. Thus among the members of the Party Congress the proportion of people with professional and secondary education is reported to have been over 50 percent even in 1934, and to have reached over 85 percent in 1952, with

more than 90 percent of the Moscow delegation consisting of members from that stratum.

From these and other figures it is evident that the Soviet Union today may recruit "only" one-third of its professional manpower into politically active positions and still be sure that this group remains a dominating element in the apparatus. This one-third proportion, incidentally, indicates the average for all professions. A group-by-group breakdown shows an interesting inequality of distribution. According to DeWitt (p. 243) the largest proportion of party members, about 38 percent, is found among engineers, the lowest, about 16 percent, among professionals in the fields of education, while among medical doctors and agricultural professionals the proportion is about 19 percent.

The relatively high degree of political activity among engineers might perhaps be expected in view of the policy priorities of the Soviet Union during the current period of grand-scale industrialization. This group's political potency is indicated not only by its party membership but also by its prominence among Soviet policymakers. As Meissner has said,<sup>3</sup> "It is not without significance that Malenkov and Krushchev, the leading representatives of the state and Party bureaucracy, are engineers by training." A number of other names also come to mind, like Pervukhin, Saburov, and, among notables of the past, Beria and Vosnezensky. Among the delegates to the 19th Party Congress (1952) the numerical prominence of engineers—282 delegates—is particularly striking when compared with the figures for the other professions listed by Meissner: teachers 98, agricultural experts 68, economists 18, doctors 11, and jurists 7. It appears that the engineering profession occupies a position in Soviet politics today somewhat comparable to that of the legal profession in Western politics.

It may be noted, too, that it is largely from Soviet leaders with a background in engineering that new, and in part deviant, political ideas have emerged, envisaging a major policymaking role for engineers ("technocracy"). The Vosnezensky and Yaro-

<sup>3</sup> Boris Meissner, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York 1956) p. 10.

shenko deviations, for example, basically involved a technocratic proposition advocating a changeover from political control to a purely administrative management by economic technicians, industrial leaders, and scientists, a "managerial revolution" of a sort. Both of these, incidentally, ended badly for their instigators. Vosnezensky's deviation led to his execution on Stalin's orders, and Stalin directed against Yaroshenko's heresies an elaborate and scornful polemic throughout a good part of his "Economic Problems in the USSR" (1952).

In sum, one might say that political indoctrination has both a conformity effect (for the majority of individuals) and an activation effect (for a minority). From the point of view of the Soviet rulers, both are useful and desirable. How far there may be boomerang effects in terms either of latent hostility toward the regime, rather than conformity, or of political heterodoxy, as in the deviations mentioned, is another matter.

A question more specifically relevant to our present topic is whether there is a significant difference in the effects on the two groups of professionals, the natural-science and the social-science groups. Social-science and related types of training involve much the heaviest doses of instruction in socio-political subjects; also, these subjects are here more directly related to the other major topics of study. Yet, if party membership represents a valid index of political participation and activity, the figures quoted point to the engineers as a far more political group than the teachers. How is this apparent contradiction to be explained? I suggest, partly by the nature of the training of the engineers, but mostly by the nature of their occupational relatedness to socio-economic matters.

In the first place, the Soviet educational system trains two types of higher engineering personnel, pure technologists and "engineer-economists," the latter being prepared for managerial as well as purely technical tasks. And second, the actual day-to-day occupational problems of the engineer, regardless of his specific training, inevitably bring him face to face with the social, economic,

and political facts of life in a more realistic fashion than is likely in the context of the teacher's daily duties. From these two points it may be assumed, first, that some engineers receive more of a social-science type of training than do others, and second, that whatever social-science and political instruction is given will generally have a relatively high rate of salience to the engineers in practical-occupational terms. This contains no implication, however, regarding the intensity of the propaganda effect. A high degree of practical occupational meaningfulness is quite compatible with a low degree of psychological penetration. Doctrines may well be assimilated as matters of routine rather than of political faith. From internal evidence (Soviet self-criticism) this indeed appears to be the case. The rank and file, as well as the officers of the party, are to a large extent practical men rather than political believers.

Turning now to the effect of political indoctrination and control on scientific and scholarly attitudes, and on actual performance (theory and research) in Soviet science, especially social science, a few general remarks are first in order. As was mentioned in an earlier context, the operative doctrine of the Soviet state is one of scientism, in the sense that it assigns overriding socio-political importance to science, and in fact presents itself as science, claiming scientific truth and validity for its every judgment. In consequence, we find political authority operating with acknowledged legitimacy in the substantive realm of theory and research. On grounds of principle there is no difference among the various disciplines in this regard. In actual fact, however, the exercise of political authority, in terms of interference with scientific and scholarly theory, is far more comprehensive in the area of human and social sciences than in that of the natural sciences and their applied disciplines. Although the difference may seem to be only one of degree, it is large enough to set the two groups of disciplines rather radically apart, both intellectually, as regards the conditions of professional operations, and socially, as regards the prestige attached to the two groups in Soviet society.

The Soviet public, as well as the scientific community, tends to be far more aware of the positive than of the restrictive aspect of the policymakers' concern with natural science and technology. The "cult of science," as expounded and practiced by the party, is perceived as the dominant feature of the situation, completely overshadowing the restrictions and interferences. In the social sciences and humanities, the situation is the very opposite, as Soviet public opinion cannot possibly fail to observe. Here the policymakers' positive concern, expressed in allocation of funds, priorities, and other active encouragements, is only a fraction of what it is in the natural sciences. Moreover, it is entirely subordinate to the restrictive aspects of policy. As a consequence, the natural sciences and the professions related to them enjoy a greater autonomy, expressed in less rigorous restrictions, and also a considerably higher prestige in Soviet society, than do the social and human sciences.

What all this adds up to is obviously that the intellectual and social climate in which Soviet social and human science operates must be unfavorable and unproductive compared to the conditions prevailing in regard to Soviet natural science, or Western science, natural and social. Consequently, while Western observers watch the developments in Soviet natural science and technology with respectful and even anxious interest, they mostly tend to dismiss Soviet social science as more or less unworthy of their attention.

There are exceptions to the second part of this rule, as evidenced in Meek's report, mentioned above, on conversations with Soviet economists, and in Jean Piaget's "Some Impressions of a Visit to Soviet Psychologists" (*International Social Science Bulletin*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1956). On the whole, however, the Western attitude is one of contempt or ignorance in the face of a performance that is considered to be poor in intellectual quality, narrow in scope, and biased in outlook. From a strictly "academic" point of view there may be some validity in this judgment, but is there any validity in the implied assumption that the West can get along without being concerned with Soviet social science, while

Soviet technology and physics are matters of vital concern to us? I shall presently set forth my own answer to this question, but various developments that may bear on it should first be discussed.

*Possible New Factors in the Situation*

Is there any reason for believing, as is sometimes contended, that new factors in the world situation—such as Stalin's death and the emerging new post-Stalinist Soviet leadership, the atomic stalemate, the upsurge of nationalism within the Soviet power bloc as well as in the Western spheres of interest—are bringing about a change in the historical situation, gradually dissolving the East-West or Soviet-West separation, thus setting the stage for overt, active, worldwide competition, over a much broader area than heretofore? And especially, what are we to make of the expectation, held by many intellectuals on both sides, that this extension of the competitive field—which here means the field of mutual discourse and scrutiny—would also include the sciences of man and society?

These questions are here to be considered briefly in terms of four major trends: first, pressures within Soviet society for new approaches to social-science and socio-political problems; second, new developments in Soviet social theory and ideology; third, satellite opposition to Soviet dominance in the social and political sciences; and fourth, the thaw in international scholarly relations.

As for the first of these developments, outspoken public criticism ("self-criticism"), in keeping with current trends, has been directed against the state of affairs in Soviet social science. Several speakers at the 20th Party Congress emphasized this subject, which was then treated with unreserved frankness in the press. A representative contribution to this debate was an article published in a Soviet journal early in 1956.<sup>4</sup> Its authors point to the decline in the quantity of output in Soviet social science over the last

<sup>4</sup> F. Burlatsky and G. Shakhnazarov, "Social Sciences and Life," in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, March 24, 1956. The following references to this paper are based on an English translation, printed in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 8, no. 15 (1956).

twenty years, citing for illustration the number of economic periodicals—a total of 8 published in 1956, as against 85 in 1936—stating that at present only one (*Voprosy ekonomiki*) is concerned with problems of economic theory, and adding: “The condition of the law and philosophical presses is by no means better.” In sum their verdict is that “our present does not compare favorably with the past in the scope and volume of publications devoted to social sciences, although the problems of these sciences have become much larger and more complex in the past 20 years.”

Far worse, however, than the decrease in volume of output is the deterioration in quality. The authors base their devastating criticism here on various criteria. In the first place, they maintain that Soviet social science at present lacks positive foundations in the reality of life (hence the title of the paper), having timidly withdrawn from any relationship to practitioners and to practical problems. “Unwilling to tackle contemporary problems,” it has turned to the past. Of 33 books published in 1955 in various social-science fields, the authors find that 29 are “devoted to historical problems.” This is certainly not for lack of important tasks in the present. The authors mention such problems as “bureaucracy, alcoholism and other negative phenomena that have not yet been overcome,” as well as shortcomings in agriculture and problems in social legislation (for example, abortion laws), to which social scientists should be able to contribute, but fail to do so.

Other “gaps and omissions” are attributed to the social scientists’ failure to appraise the importance of major intellectual discoveries, such as the theory of relativity and cybernetics, and to study foreign societies. “Competition with the capitalist countries that we are striving to outstrip economically also poses sharp problems before our social sciences. It is of great importance to us to know what happens in the capitalist countries, what their economic power is, what are the peculiarities of their development and the distribution of class forces. For this we need not those superfluous pamphlets where the authors have made it easy for themselves



by pouring reality into a ready-made mold, but profound analytical works based on reliable factual material."

The authors candidly diagnose the causes of this general timidity and mediocrity as being, first, the prevailing atmosphere of "negativistic criticism" (read: political terror), and second, the social scientists' poor knowledge of research methods, especially statistics. They have become compilers and commentators dealing with doctrines, rather than students working with data based on first-hand observation and measurement. The critics do not hesitate to put the blame for this situation where it belongs, nor do they fail to name the only real remedy: "Unfortunately, publication of such data is in an extremely unfortunate state; this was brought out by some speakers at the 20th Party Congress. It is indicative that the 1939 census is still the source for all kinds of ethnic data and indexes of nationality, class and population factors. Nor is data which can be easily obtained from election materials being published. Information on the dynamics of migration, marriage, divorce, mortality, the birth rate, and so on and so on, is still at the prewar level. It is quite obvious that the systematic publication of statistical data is important to the further development of the social sciences."

The second of the trends I have noted is the new developments in Soviet social theory and ideology itself. The general assessment of capitalism, for instance, has changed in important respects, and so has the conception of the role of war in history and the inevitability of war in the future relations between the camp of capitalism and that of socialism. There is a new look regarding the role of the Communist Party and its leadership. While these shifts in political beliefs have obvious general implications for operative Soviet views on world relations at large, certain new developments in theory and doctrine on a higher level of abstraction are probably more important with regard to the specific problems of the internationalization of Soviet social science.

I refer here, above all, to the fundamental change in Soviet social and cultural theory inaugurated by Stalin in his pronounce-



ments on linguistics (1950). What was at stake there (and still is, for this particular piece of "Stalinism," unlike the Lysenko doctrine in genetics, has been confirmed rather than repudiated since Stalin's death) was not merely an academic reevaluation of a hitherto dominant trend, the Marr school, in the study of languages, but a matter of consequence to the general Soviet interpretation of culture and society. Its full implications are not yet manifest, but as the debate continues they are becoming revealed as profound and far-reaching, extending into such fields as general logic, epistemology, and general social-science theory. Moreover, they seem likely to involve a trend toward systematic positions similar to those of Western social science, closer, in other words, to a universal theory and methodology.

N. Y. Marr's theory had for many years completely dominated the science of linguistics in the Soviet Union when in 1950 Stalin's *Pravda* letters suddenly abolished it and introduced entirely different ideas in its place. Marr (who died in 1934) was a competent scholar, specializing in the languages of the Caucasian region, and besides a convinced Marxist. In accordance with his political philosophy, he held that languages belong to the ideological superstructure in any given society, and therefore express or reflect the class struggle; the nationally dominant language of any society is that of the ruling classes. This theory was applied by the Communist and other Marxist parties in and outside the Soviet Union in support of linguistic minorities' strivings for power in a multilingual situation. An example outside the Soviet Union is Norway, where the Marxists of the 1920s and 1930s, identifying language-striving with class struggle, banded together with the populist movement in favor of the underlying folk dialect against the supremacy of the Dano-Norwegian national language.

Stalin rejected the Marr school from the position that the class-character-of-language formula is "erroneous and non-Marxist." "National languages" (such as Russian, as developed over time in speech and literature) "are not class, but common languages, common to the members of each nation and constituting the

single language of that nation," to which the existing "offshoots," "dialects," and "jargons" are subordinate.<sup>5</sup> In practical terms this Stalin thesis claims (in the name of Marx!) a position of hegemony for Russian as the national language, over the minority dialects of the nation. It also reaffirms the already existing trend of cultural nationalism, that is, identification with traditional Russian culture, its classical art and literature.

In terms of social theory the Stalin thesis involves a radical revision of the doctrines of historical materialism. If the language, with its grammatical system and vocabulary, is not a part of the ideological superstructure, and therefore is a common property of all members of the society, regardless of the historical process of class struggle, then what is the nature of such long-term historical products as man's capacity for logical thinking and, indeed, the accumulated wealth of scientific knowledge itself? Stalin declared (p. 17) that "Grammar is the outcome of a process of abstraction performed by the human mind over a long period of time; it is an indication of the tremendous achievement of thought," and he added: "In this respect grammar resembles geometry." Would this not be equally true of general logic and science? In the debate that followed Stalin's *Pravda* letters, and still goes on, this question was raised with great insistence.

In regard to the controversy on logic, an authoritative statement by the Soviet journal *Problems of Philosophy* settled the issue (at least for the time being) in 1952: "There are not two formal systems of logic—an old, metaphysical one, and a new dialectical one, no more than there are two arithmetics or grammars, one metaphysical and one dialectical. There is only one formal logic and that is universally human; this is a collection of the elementary rules of thinking and the simple theory of these rules."

The problem of the sciences seems more complicated. Here the recent debate has tended to acknowledge that the exact and natural sciences are: first, per se materialistic; and second, uni-

<sup>5</sup> J. V. Stalin, "Concerning Marxism in Linguistics," English translation (London 1950) pp. 9, 15, 16.

versal, in the sense of being a product not only of any particular type of society, but of the intellectual progress of mankind as such. In practice, Soviet natural science operates by and large on this basic assumption, and today is, in fact, predominantly international.

As regards the social and human sciences, the recent debate still assumes that they are part of the superstructure (here socialist, here capitalist), and therefore belong in a different category from the natural sciences, but there seems to be a new mobility in the positions taken. The dichotomy is no longer quite so sharp and absolute as before. M. G. Lange, observing the lively debate in the Soviet Zone of Germany, remarks (p. 199) that "mathematics and the natural sciences were not the only disciplines the social impact of which was redefined after 1950," and, more specifically (p. 191), "all the social sciences were affected by Stalin's pronouncements" on linguistics.

What this means is not that Soviet social science has yet reached the point where it is, or will overnight become, universal and international in character, similar to the natural sciences. But it does indicate quite a few "broken windows," and a state of philosophic crisis and fermentation in which definite tendencies toward a convergence with Western social science are discernible.

A case in point, to mention but one instance, is the current controversy among Soviet social scientists over the problem of statistics. The issue here is whether or not statistics is a universal method, equally applicable to both nature and society. The official view was expressed by Academician K. V. Ostrovitianov (described as "the chief organizer of Soviet economists") in his account<sup>6</sup> of the Moscow Conference on Statistics, March 1954, to the effect that there are two different kinds of statistics: "mathematical statistics," applicable to nature; and simply "statistics," applicable to society. The report does not conceal the fact, however, that this view met with considerable opposition among Soviet statisticians, and that there is a universalist school of

<sup>6</sup> Reprinted in English in *Soviet Studies*, vol. 6 (1954-55) pp. 321-31.

thought, represented by Professors Pisarev, Nemchinov, and others, considerably closer to the Western way of thinking in these matters.

The debate discloses a sharp division among Soviet social scientists, as Ostrovitianov's choice of language indicates: "The comrades who regard statistics as a universal science which studies nature and society make of it some kind of science over and above the classes, coldly indifferent to good and to evil, without any preference at all as between classes and between social structures." The fact that the political chief of Soviet economists admits that this overt division exists may partly be due to a relative increase in intellectual tolerance. Probably, however, it is attributable in great part to the fact that the divergent views have by now become too strong and too widespread to be categorically suppressed. The crisis in social theory has arrived.

The third trend I mentioned is satellite opposition to Soviet dominance in the social and political sciences. This has become particularly evident in recent years, especially in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. There the previous claim that the Soviet Union and its leadership is the ultimate source of truth and authority in the social sciences is no longer accepted as axiomatic by intellectuals, as is evidenced by the many defections of students and professors from East German universities and the uncompromising deviations of others, like Professor Georg Lukács of Hungary and Professor Wolfgang Harich of the Soviet university in East Berlin. The revolt against Soviet monopoly control involves an active reorientation among satellite social scientists, toward intellectual freedom and, specifically, free communication with the West.

The fact that the open revolt has been momentarily crushed (Lukács, for instance, was forcibly exiled, Harich condemned to ten years in jail) will hardly remove its deeper causes, nor is it likely to enable the Soviet rulers and their puppets to return all the way back to the policy of total Iron Curtain control, keeping the satellite peoples in isolation. For that, too many windows have been broken, too many doors opened, and sooner or later

the Soviets will have to adjust to the new situation, permitting or even promoting the exchange they can no longer prevent.

Finally, we come now to the fourth trend, the thaw in international scholarly relations. Evidence of this has been seen recently in the increased interest shown by Soviet and Western social scientists in each other's published output; in the participation of Soviet representatives at international social-science congresses; in the new opportunities for exchange visits by individual students crossing the dividing line from both sides.

In familiarity with the other's published production the Soviets are ahead of us, in that they have adopted a definite policy of studying Western output while we hold on to a careless indifference toward what they are doing. Thus Professor Meek found in his visits at Soviet universities that the economics students were reading Keynes' *General Theory* as well as authors like Marshall, Fisher, and J. B. Clark, all in Russian translations, and that many other standard works were available and eagerly read in the original. Other reports indicate that Soviet economists are seeking instruction from Western sources on certain strategic problems, such as those of underdeveloped countries (*Soviet Survey*, p. 6). In fields like political science and sociology the Soviet students are probably, at present, far less versed in the writings of their Western counterparts, but here again the policy is definitely to encourage study of "bourgeois" literature.

In part this increased familiarity with Western social science is obviously intended to improve Soviet capabilities in the ideological conflict, both defensively, in countering Western critique of the Soviet system, and in offensive terms, by sharpening the instruments of attack against capitalism. In part, however, this knowledge is sought also for the help it can give in coping with pressing internal problems in Soviet society itself. Both these aims are clearly stated in the following sentences with which Academician P. Fedoseyev, the leader of the Soviet delegation at the World Congress of Sociologists (August 1956), concluded his report on the lessons of that meeting (*Pravda*, October 19, 1956):

Something which attracts attention is the enormously rich literature existing in the capitalist countries in various fields and on different questions in sociology. It must be said that this literature is not subjected to a critical analysis by the workers in the social sciences in the Soviet Union or the countries of the People's Republics. Of these problems, extremely few scientific works are published with us, especially there is little research done on questions that belong in the borderline areas between, on the one hand philosophy and historical materialism, on the other hand, economics, law, technology and geography. The sociological problems concerning labor, culture, ways of life, family, morals, urban and rural living, require more profound study and elucidation from all angles. It is the duty of the workers in the social sciences to liquidate this serious shortcoming in their work.

If this statement reflects a genuine policy resolution for Soviet sociology, it seems to call for a reappraisal of the value of the Amsterdam Congress, and particularly of the Soviet-Western encounter that took place there. Comments by Western participants have been negative, expressing annoyance and frustration over a deadlocked dialogue, and over the fact that our partners showed so little professional grasp of modern sociology and the subjects under debate.<sup>7</sup> In the light of Fedoseyev's interpretation of what the Congress meant to him and his Soviet colleagues we may have to revise our judgment somewhat.

Is it likely that events and factors like the four trends I have discussed will eventuate in the Soviet Union in a more universal (Western type) approach to social and human problems and to the social sciences? Will these and other major forces currently at work in Soviet society produce a desire or even an objective necessity for an undoctринаire reality-orientation toward the social universe, similar to that sought by Western social science? The answer can be provided only by future events themselves. I suggest, however, that Western social scientists should act on the

<sup>7</sup> See especially *Soviet Survey*, pp. 12-15; also Norman Birnbaum, "Science, Ideology and Dialogue," in *Commentary* (1956) pp. 567-75.

assumption that the answer will be affirmative, and pursue the goal of a systematic internationalization of their disciplines. This will involve a deliberate, consistent policy in relation to our Soviet counterparts.

### *A Policy Proposal*

I contend that Soviet social science, be it rich or poor, is an eminently political factor of strategic importance in the total East-West situation. It is this not as "propaganda" but because it conceptualizes the dominant Soviet ideas of man and society, of power and history, of capitalism and socialism, of international relations and the world conflict. In other words, it sets the framework in which the rulers and the ruled interpret the political universe and define their own actions within that universe. Thus it is a guiding force in Soviet politics.

When I say Soviet social science I refer to the total body of propositions in the various disciplines, a body that is in Western terms a hybrid of fact and doctrine, with the second always the core of the whole. This means that in dealing with Soviet social science we shall, whether we like it or not, have to deal with the doctrine called Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. There is considerable reluctance in the West, and especially in the United States, to spend time and brain power on understanding communist doctrine. The highbrows dismiss it as "intellectual fabrications" hardly worth the candle. The lowbrows reject it as the devil's own work, and brand as a traitor anyone who tries to understand what it is about. Even among special students of Soviet affairs there are some who ignore the communist doctrine. Another and more general bias, among American social and political scientists, seems to operate against the economic and historical approach to society, in favor of a psychological-behavioral approach, hardly an adequate tool in dealing with this particular subject matter.

If Western social science is to relate itself meaningfully to its Soviet counterpart, it will have to master communist doctrine—that is to say, devote serious study to it and produce an adequate



number of specialists who, without being "believers," know and understand it from within. There is merit in the idea once suggested by an American social scientist, that every university in this country ought to have on its teaching staff at least one first-rate specialist in Marxism, one who, without fear of suspicion, would teach the new generation how to master intellectually the doctrine that is the heart of communist power. Only with this knowledge can the West hope to master it, or indeed survive it politically.

On the basis of a better intellectual mastery of communist doctrine and ideology, Western social scientists should actively study the work of their Soviet counterparts in the various disciplines. This means systematic research in various directions: studies of the institutional establishments, the personnel, the mode of operations, the published production of Soviet social science. We should become fully as familiar with the situation there as we are, through the DeWitt report and other studies, with Soviet natural science and technology. The objective, however, would be different. Unlike that of the earlier studies the primary aim would not be political intelligence, that is, an assessment of Soviet strength, but rather the substantive policy objective of internationalizing the social sciences. The term "internationalize" is to be understood here as a development toward social-science theories and methods that are equally valid east and west of the great divide.

Western social scientists should set for themselves the very objective that Academician Fedoseyev envisaged for Soviet sociologists, and "liquidate a serious shortcoming in their work" by discovering what the fellows in the other camp are doing. While the two operations, Soviet and Western, would not be strictly reciprocal, either in motives or in procedures, they still should offer mutual opportunities and challenges. If the Soviets are eager, the West has all the more reason to proceed vigorously.

On our part, one important aim would be simply to see what we can learn from Soviet social science on the substance of general



theoretical and other problems in the various disciplines. This might or might not amount to much of a net gain—in some fields, like economics, probably more than in others, like sociology. In any case, it would be only the first and immediate objective of our effort. In addition, we stand to gain in knowledge of Soviet society itself, the status and structure of its intellectual and professional population, the particular conditions and roles of its social scientists, and numerous similar questions. Far more important, however, is a still further objective, that of establishing an “exchange situation” with Soviet social science. What would this require of us?

It would require that our receptivity to Soviet output be not merely specialized, that is, limited to expert groups and special journals, but generalized, covering both a wider public and more numerous channels of communication. Concretely, the professional magazines and other technical literature in Western languages should deal more with past and current Soviet writings, review and summarize their content, and subject them to rigorous, specific, and constructive criticism in terms of our own standards. We would benefit from this ourselves, and Soviet students reading our publications would discover not only the ideas and findings of Western social science as such, but also their application and relevance to the teachings and problems of Soviet social scientists.

With regard to the published output of our own social science the “exchange situation” could best be established by improving communication through already available media, especially by adding Russian-language summaries and abstracts to some of our leading social-science periodicals, and by publishing occasional articles designed for the Soviet reader, surveying large areas of recent work in Western social science. If Western production is to be actively received and have an effect on the other side, it is not irrelevant for us to wonder whether, or how far, we answer their questions, or indeed, whether we even ask them.

As a means of developing the “exchange situation” I have deliberately stressed communication through the impersonal mass

medium of print, and through the conventional, existing channels available to the profession. This does not imply that other means should be excluded. To the extent that government policies, East and West, permit other modes of contact and communication—by exchange of visitors, by study abroad, by international meetings and conferences, and by individual correspondence and exchange of publications—these should be employed. Yet it should be remembered that confrontation through the mass medium of print is usually a necessary first step before a real dialogue can take place. Also, the mass medium reaches a far wider circle of people, including many individuals who may not be accessible to person-to-person encounters with foreigners, especially among the younger students and those who do not enjoy Communist Party favors, like a passport or an appointment for travel abroad.

Whether the conventional channels of publication already available to Western social science should be supplemented by other media, like radio, is problematic. It would not be difficult to design programs of social-science subjects, variously addressed to specialists, teachers, individuals in the socio-economic managerial professions; and there is no reason why such programs should not in themselves be objectively good and also interesting to listeners. There is a danger, however, that the context in which they would appear, if transmitted by a Western international broadcasting agency, would make them suspect as items of political propaganda. This result would be quite contrary to the intention that should guide Western social scientists in their communication with the Soviets.

That intention would be not merely to make friends and meet people, but to end the state of insulation between the Soviets and ourselves, and establish communication in a limited area of crucial importance. Our aim would emphatically not be to "manipulate" or even to "liberate," but simply to establish a common universe of discourse and research, within which we could together develop an international social science.

# ARISTOTLE AND THE STUDY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

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THE DISCIPLINE of political science is characterized by compartmentalization into special fields of empirical research. These fields are most commonly treated as a species of contemporary institutional history, and scarcely more attempt is made to identify, test, and correlate key hypotheses and their logical consequences than is made by the historian. The preoccupation of political theorists with the monuments of the past, the history of ideas, and moral speculation has led to a neglect of the urgent task of providing theoretical unification for the discipline, a comprehensive theoretical description of our present body of empirical data, and an adequate directing framework for new research. Lack of such theory results in an anarchy of intellectual *laissez faire*, uncompensated for by any "unseen hand" producing an effective, productive cooperation among us. The net result is that research is not additive in its findings, and that each individual must in a sense go it alone.

The alternative to rugged intellectual individualism is not some theoretical five-year plan to regiment research. Rather it is to recognize the need, and get at the business of working up generalized empirical theory that can guide research in specific areas and meaningfully interrelate all areas. Hopefully there will be many such theories competing in the market place of ideas, subjecting themselves to the test of facts and guiding empirical research into theoretically significant channels. This neglected aspect of political science, so well appreciated by Aristotle, badly needs rehabilitation in the discipline. It does not mean a new plague of methodologists, with large foundation grants to work out schemes for working out schemes for manufacturing high-level theory. Methodology will most fruitfully develop out of serious work in

important problems. The history of the discipline has pretty well indicated what a number of these are. It seems likely that the dearth of general empirical theory is due not to lack of methodology, but to lack of a sustained structured interest in the profession.

We have acted on a sort of hope that if enough facts are collected they will somehow sort and illuminate themselves. A becoming modesty and an overwhelming respect for the ancients have paralyzed our own originality and made historians of us all. It is high time we took courage and renewed the high enterprise that was carried forward not only by careful scientists like Aristotle, but even by inspired dilettantes like Rousseau. We may well hope that if this enterprise is put on a continuing organized basis, empirical theory in political science can have an ongoing career in John Dewey's sense, rather than resembling as it now does the history of the great works of art, with no more interconnection and development than that between Rembrandt and Picasso.

Perhaps as promising a place as any to start the business of building an empirical theory is with the field of local government. The nearer we get to the ultimate face-to-face groups of the family, the clan, the tribe, the village, the town, the city, the county, the closer we come to dealing with phenomena that promise generality and provide useful points of departure for the investigation of the power and opinion structures that characterize differing political systems. The unity of politics for scientific inquiry, if unity there be, lies in the continuum of mutual influence and interaction that links the person, the family, the hamlet, the city, the region, the nation, and the world with one another as inter-related foci of interest and influence in a commonly shared dynamic field.

One of the major weapons of scientific inquiry is comparison, the notation of significant similarities and differences between the objects compared. Certainly the father of the profession, Aristotle, with his detailed comparison of constitutions, was a comparative-government man if ever there was one, and his conception of

constitutions was broad and realistic enough to range from the ethos of the ruling class and the techniques of dictatorship and revolution to the statics and dynamics of prevailing economic systems. By itself, however, the commandment to compare is insufficient if we do not insist on the selection of the significant for comparison.

Here indeed is the rub for the crude empiricist: out of the multitude of things that might be compared, how to select the significant? Fortunately, this is no problem *ab ovo*. We are the heirs to a tradition that has wrestled for upwards of two thousand years with the question of what are the significant phenomena of politics; nor is our own contemporary culture barren of value systems to guide us in the selection of "interesting" hypotheses; and lastly, despite its lack of a satisfactory career, political science has empirical theories of politics sufficient to suggest "interesting topics" for comparative analysis. Indeed, were we to utilize some of our most promising empirical theory that has lain dormant in the clutches of metaphysicians, moral philosophers, and the historians of ideas, we might witness a renaissance in the discipline similar to that occasioned by the rediscovery of the classics in other ages.

But for such a rebirth, no servile and uncomprehending imitation will do. Only a creative use of the perennial sources of insight furnished by truly great minds deeply grounded in the realities of political behavior can give a Baconian direction to what in the past has lent itself to a priestly and snobbish ritual of the great books, where in all truth the wisdom of an Aristotle or a Plato is so securely embalmed that no dangerous breath of life can emerge to disturb the complacent and uncomprehending repetition of formulae grown meaningless and empty of contemporary significance.

It will be the contention of this paper that an application of the Aristotelian categories of analysis to the phenomena of local government will make for the development of theory capable of unifying the discipline.

## I

The key to Aristotle's political philosophy lies in his identification of politics with ethics—his conception of the state as being most significantly a medium for the realization of some conception of the good life, and indeed as being the master institution for this purpose, to which all others are teleologically subservient. Aristotle's exclusive preoccupation with the city-state as the chosen vehicle for man's ethical self-realization has given his work a deceptive appearance of irrelevance to later and widely different forms of political life. The ethical and sociological interest central to Greek political thought was replaced by Roman legalism, and the Christian separation of church and state undermined the primacy of the state's ethical role.

Rehabilitation of Greek political thought by theorists such as Rousseau and Hegel has seemed, on the one hand, to abandon empirical inquiry for metaphysical speculation and, on the other, to enthrone an ethical theory fraught with the menace of totalitarian absolutism. Empirical investigation into the ethical nature of political associations has by and large been treated either as identical with some variant of Hegelian metaphysics or as an attempt to resurrect the natural-law theory slain by Hume. But one may well reject Hegel, and Marx, and natural law, one may even be a good disciple of Hume, and still insist on the reality of ethics as an empirical datum of the first magnitude. Its neglect is little short of an evisceration of the subject matter of politics.

One may well go along with Aristotle in insisting on the prime significance of ethics as a "brute fact" of politics without accepting Aristotelian metaphysics. Aristotle the political scientist can be severed from Aristotle the metaphysician. The ethical structures of political societies are not merely oughts for the sermons of theologians and the homilies of moral philosophers, but in all scientific seriousness are most significant *is's* for empirical inquiry. Lest I be misunderstood on this point, I mean no disparagement of rational evaluation of ethical structures. There is no more important function than that of valuation. It uses, but differs

from, science. Value structures, however, are most significant empirical facts for scientific inquiry, if we would understand the groups and societies whose behavior is informed by them.

For Aristotle the structure of politics is a structure of institutions, running from the family through the village and the town to the state, each subordinate institution contributing its appropriate part to the final end embodied in the polis state. The state is characterized by its regime, which exemplifies a particular conception of the good life, be it the wealth of oligarchy, the freedom of democracy, or the martial spirit of a timocracy. The ethical principle embodied in the constitution sets the standard for distributive justice in the state; determines the nature and composition of the politeuma, the ruling class, whose members in one sense are or personify the constitution; and informs the subordinate institutions with their appropriate roles in each particular type of constitution.

The Aristotelian conception of autarchy or self-sufficiency sets the limit to the progression of social institutions. The final unit, the state, is self-sufficient and therefore inclusive of all the others. Self-sufficiency depends in part on military and economic considerations, but most significantly on ethical. It is for this reason that Aristotle, the tutor of Alexander and the friend of Antipater, could retain his allegiance to the city-state in the face of the bitter facts of Greek experience.

But again, Aristotle's predilection for the city-state form by no means limits to the city-state the applicability of the concept of ethical self-sufficiency. As a concept for analyzing the units of government, and the relations of individual and subordinate groups to them, ethical self-sufficiency can play a role similar to that of sovereignty, and more discriminating. The delimitation of ethical communities, and the description of their interrelationships and participants, may be sociologically and politically more meaningful than comparable legal analysis.

The nature of the state, as opposed to its lesser political subdivisions, is that it is ethically "sovereign." Its end is the highest,



to which all other associations contribute or should contribute, and are subordinate. Aristotle was well aware that not all actual governments were of such a character. The governments of the barbarians, and indeed many of the Greek governments, exemplified no ethically satisfying end in which citizens as opposed to mere subjects could participate. An ethically satisfying state was for Aristotle a requirement for the fullest development of man. It is not merely a metaphysical requirement, but one that human nature will strive for, however imperfectly, in particular and adverse circumstances. It is thus an empirical fact of human behavior, not just a moral postulate.

The simple scheme of Book I of the *Politics* describes an ethically graded series of associations rising from the household to the polis, with each step in the ascent characterized by an ethically more inclusive and higher end. On the basis of this analysis, local government is differentiated from the higher levels of government as ethically insufficient to stand by itself and as merely ministerial to an end more adequately realized in a higher level. Thus for Aristotle and Plato the village is, if not a "city of pigs," still too uncivilized for the highest human self-realization. It is inadequate to provide the scope necessary to the fullest self-realization of man, and is therefore lacking in self-sufficiency.

If on one end of the ethical scale of associations, the village is inadequate and the household even more so, the polis itself is characterized by ethical self-sufficiency and a degree of economic and military competence. Aristotle is not talking about an isolated state in an international vacuum. There will be treaties and alliances, economic, military, and for other purposes; there may be Pan Hellenic Festivals and Olympic Games—and thus there are more broadly inclusive associations than the polis (the state). But these broader associations are characterized by partial and less inclusive purposes. They do not contemplate "the whole end of man."

If one puts the Aristotelian schema aside for the moment, and

considers the ordering of associations and especially governmental associations in accordance with the value—and perhaps one should say the felt value—of their ethical ends, it is clear that the Aristotelian picture of a neatly ascending hierarchy, though logically attractive, may or may not be the case from one situation to another. Just as the Austinean schema would give us a neatly ascending order to the final sovereign, so the Aristotelian would give us a hierarchy mounting to the ethically sovereign association. The polemics on sovereignty have frequently led to metaphysical debates between monists and pluralists. A similar logomachy could develop from any conception of an ethically sovereign state. What is important is to investigate the ethical character of governmental associations as significant empirical data of political life.

As an empirical fact, any given state is a community of communities. Some of the most important of these communities are formally political in character. They serve ends that are variously interrelated, and these ends rate more or less highly as values to the participants in the communities. A well ordered state would be, for Aristotle, one in which the subordinate communities were articulated instrumentally and ethically with the final community, the state. This would mean that a democratic state would ideally call for democratic local government, or that an oligarchical state would call for oligarchical local government.

In practice, to be sure, the ideal may be far from realized. But this is more than a mere matter of the aesthetic disruption of a tidy-minded constitution-maker's organization chart. If Aristotle's theory of revolution is empirically warranted, this contradiction in the ethical constitution of the state is productive of stasis—is in fact a present indication of the disintegration of the ethical constitution of the state. In the more homely terms of Lincoln, "a house divided against itself cannot stand." For Lincoln as for Aristotle, ethical principles embodied in the values of living men struggle for institutional life, for survival and expansion. The very stuff of politics is made up of these conflicts, and the most

significant meaning of institutions lies in the ethic that structures the variety of human attitudes toward them, ranging from ardent participation and advocacy through lukewarmness and apathy to violent protest and opposition.

A vast modern nation state, such as the United States, contrasts sharply in territory and population with the city-state of antiquity. It is not, however, the ethically formless mass that Aristotle so despised in Babylon, though Aristotle's strictures of Babylon are not without telling applicability to the megalopolis of our day and to the nation itself. The belief that a despotic rule over slaves is the only possible political organization for a large territory was not clearly Aristotle's final view, since his advice to Alexander urged the latter to rule the Greeks as a leader though the barbarian despotically, as a master. Be this as it may, the empirical fact is that however different the participation and the interaction, the modern nation-state can have citizens rather than subjects, and can and does have a constitution in the Aristotelian sense. This constitution is of great significance for the subordinate associations in the state.

Aristotle's analysis of constitutions is complex. It is nowhere systematically spelled out in the *Politics*, but in general I believe Sabine is right in contending that, for Aristotle, constitutional government ideally requires a government of law over willing subjects in the common interest. Any or all of these qualities might be lacking, however, and there would still be a kind of constitution—if, for Aristotle, a perverted one. Aristotle's empirical analysis led him to identify several interacting aspects of constitutions as going concerns. In one aspect they are a certain ordering of offices; this is the legal constitution, concerned with the formal division of power. In another there is the economic or, more broadly speaking, the sociological constitution, the actual economic and social structure of the society that underlies and informs the legal constitution. And there is finally the ethical constitution, the conception of the good life that rationalizes the whole social and legal structure and provides the principle of

distributive justice in the state. These three aspects of the constitution are in dynamic interaction, though for Aristotle the ethical is clearly the most important. In shorthand, Aristotle describes the constitution as the ruling class and the ruling class as the constitution. The ruling class is the ethic of the constitution made flesh, embodying it. Because it does, it is the ruling class, and because this ethic is generally accepted it rules over willing subjects. How important the ethical constitution is, and how painful deviations from it may become, are illustrated by Gunnar Myrdal in *The American Dilemma*.

## II

Professor Louis Hartz has argued that American political life has been characterized by a massive acceptance of a Lockean ethic. Implicit in this ethic is a justification for a given "ordering of offices": a certain type of ruling class and its recruitment and a set of supporting economic and social institutions. The bearers of this ethic are driven to seek its institutionalization through society. The United States is certainly no tight little city-state, but a continent with wide variation in social and economic conditions. Local heresies from the central conception of the good life are inevitable. And yet, looking at the formal "ordering of the offices," the legal structure of the subpolities of the American polity, there is an apparent monotonous uniformity that makes most texts in state and local government arid in the extreme. Does this mean that the overriding ethic of the national polity has indeed informed the political subdivisions, as in Aristotelian theory it ideally should? Or does it mean that political scientists, despite Aristotle's example to the contrary, have confined themselves merely to the legal constitution, and have neglected the social-economic and the ethical?

In view of the continental sweep of American politics, we can expect state and local governments to show a wide deviation from the national norm, to have individual constitutions in the Aristotelian sense, with significant differences that cannot be adequately

described in the strong-mayor, weak-mayor, city-manager, and commission legal typology that divides our municipal Gaul into four unequal parts. V. O. Key has urged, and in his *Southern Politics* has begun to make respectable, a recognition of the deviant that has hitherto been the province of the muckraker and the journalist rather than of the orthodox political scientist. A comparative approach would open a rich mine of local "constitutions," varying from the narrowest oligarchy to the freest democracy, and from the most brutal tyranny to a near philosopher-king. A recent *Saturday Evening Post* headlined a story, "Tyrant in Texas," the story of George Parr, so-called Duke of Duval County. This regime lasted for years, under the forms of law. Bell County, Kentucky, killed its opponents with impunity and dominated the courts, and its tyranny was finally overthrown only from without. The Imperial Valley in California exhibits a brutal oligarchy that tolerates no nonsense from its helots. The investigations of the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee documented the deviant local constitutions. The company towns of the nineteenth century not only illustrate the concentration of economic and political power in a ruling oligarchy or tyranny, but provide a classic example of the transition of oligarchy to a broader based polity.

Thus, under the deceptive uniformity of an apparently similar legal structure, a wide range of actual variance appears in the "constitutions" of our local governments. And it is under these "constitutions" that many, if not most, people have to live the most significant parts of their lives. We have no adequate information as to these "actual constitutions," the degree of their prevalence in their different forms, and the extent to which they cover, for practical purposes, the political life of those subject to them. We are even in the dark as to any cumulative trends.

It may be disquieting to realize that, in respects important for significant groups of the population, the American government that counts is oligarchical or tyrannical rather than democratic. The implications for the superior levels of government of variant

constitutions below are serious. As Madison pointed out, an advantage that the expanse of the country gives to federalism is the possibility of restricting political contagion to the infected governmental cell, walling it off, and, after rallying the healthy corpuscles, restoring the normative order. Another advantage lies in the capacity to tolerate, under the cloak of lip service to the respectable national norm, wide deviations in practice dictated by differing social and economic situations.

Yet local government on the firing line must be a major determinant of the realities at the national level. Caciquism, the rule of local chieftains, made a mockery of parliamentary democracy in eastern Europe, parts of Italy, Spain, and South America. Perhaps the *tutelle administrative* of France may indicate the real possibility of centralized national democracy unsupported by extensive local foundations. Or one may see in France's apathetic masses a result that Burke foresaw in a metaphysical constitution that denies the necessity of mediating institutions between individual and nation. Surely the trends of our local constitutions, as they develop toward a more extensive prevalence of oligarchy, democracy, or ochlocracy, and their variants, are highly significant for the future of state and national government.

Each local jurisdiction, with important powers of police, justice, and taxation, can resemble a feudatory, with high, middle, and low justice; can constitute a little world for some, if not all, of its inhabitants; and can as truly represent a way of life as ancient Athens. The Aristotelian view sees the relationship between levels of government as most importantly a hierarchy of increasingly more self-sufficient ethical associations, until in the state self-sufficiency is attained. A part of the reason for the more primitive associations entering into the higher is military and economic, but by themselves these motives would not constitute a sufficient bond to produce a new political unity. Thus a NATO, or even an EDC, does not constitute a state, nor will a private or public international coal-and-steel cartel produce one. A community or

friendship for business may produce a cartel or an International Rotary, a similar association for defense may produce a military alliance, but by themselves these purposes are insufficient to structure a political union. For this, according to Aristotle, a commonly shared and participated-in conception of a good life is essential.

The significance of this for local government, and its relation to the higher levels of government, lies in the widely felt differences regarding the importance of the various communities' purposes. The sense of the significance of the community's ethical value varies as between communities, and as between inhabitants of the same community. Thus a citizen of Quebec may find his provincial loyalty far more meaningful than his Canadian citizenship. Robert E. Lee, wending his way sadly back to his native Virginia, illustrates a type of conflict that reaches beyond the formal context of legal federalism. The scale of areal and governmental loyalties has a wide range of possibilities. While secession may not be a realistic possibility for Yorkville Nazis, a species of spiritual and even politically effective secession can occur. Nullification is not just a Southern states-rights phenomenon, and the non-enforcement of federal and state law is a significant aspect of political geography.

Not only may citizens of local governments limit or even cut their allegiance to state and national governments, by apathy and neglect, if not outright revolt; also at the local level they may exhibit little or no allegiance. Many an ardent young progressive is condemned to live in the Republican desert of an otherwise charming suburb. The split between the local citizens and the purely national citizens is a common problem of party politics. Thus the question of who are and who are not citizens is more than a mere legalism, although legal right is not without relevance. A most significant question of citizenship is that asking who participates in the ethical conception of the good life, embodied in the constitution of the community, and how the community's



institutions, both formal and informal, are designed to effectuate participation.

If Aristotle, Plato, the Catholic church, the American Legion, the totalitarian states, and many others are right in the critical political importance they assign to education, then the educational systems, both formal and informal, that characterize our communities are of central significance. These institutions not only indoctrinate youth in the spirit of the polity; they also serve in part to separate the men of gold from the men of silver and the men of brass. The free and easy Periclean high school of the older small community mixed all social classes, nationalities, races, and religions in a school whose creed was likely to be Locke and Jefferson with a dash of the Napoleonic gospel that every private carries a marshal's baton in his knapsack.

A principal political effect of the motor car and the bedroom suburb has been the one-class school. For certain racial and national minorities, segregation and the peculiar operations of the real-estate trade had already, to some extent, produced this independently in the larger cities. The extent to which a counter-trend at institutions of higher learning may overcome the influence of early education is problematic. In so far as churches, boy scouts, other youth organizations are an important factor in the role training and indoctrination of youth, they well warrant study. Each community has a system of educational institutions to indoctrinate youth in the spirit of the polity and confirm them in the principle of distributive justice by which role allocation is justified.

The political effect of parochialization of the schools is widely recognized. Yet study of the school system as a "brute fact" of American politics, and as much so as the party system, is avoided—and at the cost of losing that refreshing and serene realism that characterizes Greek political thought. We may, and in fact as disciples of Locke we must, reject the Aristotelian identification of politics with pedagogy. The ideal of the state as a glorified

Rugby is incompatible with a political philosophy that refuses to see the the individual and society as reaching their fulfillment in the state. But while rejecting the metaphysical idea of the ethical ultimacy of the state, and its corollary that the state should be an all-inclusive educational institution, we must acknowledge the important political functions of education.

The struggle for the minds of men is a pervasive and never ending battle. Recently the newspapers of an Ohio city rebuked the local leaders of the AFL for seeking to organize the school-teachers with the avowed intent of getting across to the students a point of view sympathetic to labor. The union leaders replied to the outraged rebuke that this was the only way they had to break the monopoly of their opponents on the formal educational system. The process of education is central to the indoctrination of the young and the recruitment of the governing class. It complements and sometimes competes with the family, the church, and other social organizations that perform similar functions.

### III

For Aristotle the key to the constitution is the governing class. Here is the human embodiment of the constitution. It spells out in clearly legible "big letters" what may be obscure or hidden in the legal constitution. The governing class represents or appears to represent the qualities that exemplify the conception of the good life that informs the constitution. Its members are looked up to and admired, since they most fully reflect the ideal. Their position is felt to be just, to be legitimate, because in terms of the particular constitution it is just that the richest, the most noble, the most learned, should rule.

The institutions of the society, if it is to be stable, must buttress and reinforce the principle of legitimacy. So viewed, ideally, all institutions are shaped to give effect to an ethical norm; viewed in another respect, all institutions are shaped to support the claims of a particular governing class. Thus the Federalist parson and pedagogue justified the government of the wise and the good,

who turned out to be the rich and the well born. Art, literature, religion, and manners, and the social structures through which they operate, are pregnant with political consequences. They serve to support or undermine a given political order. As Irving Babbitt once remarked, all great revolutions are preceded by a revolution in the dictionary. The key value terms of a society undergo a change, sapping the symbols of legitimacy of a given order.

Governments, local and state, may range from a tight oligarchy of wealth to a demagogic mass dictatorship. For the most part, pure forms are rare. As Aristotle pointed out, there are many claims to political power: wealth, free birth, numbers, noble birth, military prowess, and the like. All of these have a real but limited justice. A stable constitution requires that no single claim prevail, and that at least wealth be tempered by numbers. In fact, this mixed government or polity is best achieved through the predominance of the middle class. Where the rich confront the poor with little or no middle class between them, the city is divided into irreconcilable armed camps. A sociological and economic substructure is necessary to support a given constitution, and that constitution will be radically altered by economic change, as from a peasant democracy to an urban proletariat. Thus Aristotle recognizes that ruling class, legal constitution, ethical order, and economy are interdependent. Changes in one aspect have significant consequences for all others in the dynamic equilibrium of the constitution.

When we apply Aristotle's conception of constitution to state and local governments, each unit of government may be conceived of as possessed of a ruling class. From the composition and character of this ruling class emerges the real nature of the local government's constitution, as opposed to the formal legal order. The holders of political office represent a small fraction of the ruling class; the offices of the formal political order may be among the less important in the community. The separation of church and state, of politics and economics, veils some of the jagged peaks

of the pyramid of power. The princes of the church, the presidents of the banks, the editors of the newspapers, the manufacturers, the labor-union leaders, the leaders of society, of fraternal organizations, of nationality and racial groups are not, as such, officers of the formal government. But if government be regarded as a decision-making process, much of the action of the formal government is mere ratification of decisions made by these holders of social power. For this reason Marx and his followers have maintained that bourgeois democracy is a fraud, in which the pseudo-equality of the ballot box hides the realities of the unequal distribution of power. As John Adams wrote to Jefferson, there are nobles in Boston as well as in Madrid.

Conservatives in the early American state constitutional conventions protested again and again that abolition of the property qualification for office or suffrage would prove pernicious or nugatory. Property was an indestructible part of political power, and failure to recognize it in the constitution would lead either to a demagogic assault on wealth or to the devising of informal means whereby wealth would achieve its inevitable influence in the power structure of the community. To the realists of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the struggle between the rich and the poor, the few and the many, seemed as invariant a problem of politics as it did to Plato and Aristotle. The opponents of the Daniel Shays, while doubtless seeking to provide in the constitution an instrumentality for the solution of common social problems, frequently argued in terms reminiscent of the pages of Thucydides. Their advocacy was couched in the language of frightened oligarchs seeking to band themselves together in a league to furnish mutual aid and comfort against one another's threatening democracies.

The wisdom of the fathers is full of reference to the bloody social politics of the republics of antiquity. In no respect does their political science seem more faulty than in its gloomy prophecies that political democracy means social democracy, and social

democracy means class war. On the other hand, the twin inventions of representation and federalism—in which the authors of the *Federalist* set considerable stock as so extending the feasible territorial limits of free government as to diffuse and dilute interests, and so break the force of faction—have appeared to succeed beyond their fondest hopes. Given their dour view of the nature of man, the Federalists could scarcely have dreamed that our cities and local governments would be so free of the mischief of faction as would appear from contemporary textbooks. One would never gather from a text on local government that the prime fact of politics is the struggle of classes, or that the central question of government is the ruling class.

The gulf between Aristotle and the eighteenth-century realists, on the one hand, and contemporary political science on the other is vividly apparent in the preoccupation of the former with stasis and the problems of class rule, and our present attitude of avoidance or indifference toward these issues. In part, this difference of approach results from a belief that the phenomena of class struggle, which are fundamental in Aristotelian analysis, are simply not exemplified in the American scene. In part, it is due to a belief in a fundamental social-harmony theory, similar to that of classical economics. This view results in a conception of a system of political *laissez faire* in which, as in economic *laissez faire*, no one rules. Free political competition exists in much the same way as free economic competition.

A more realistic view would see our political organization as a system that, while differing in part, is nonetheless comparable to a system of Greek city-states or to the feudal lordships and free cities of the Middle Ages, clusters of power and local government under varying degrees of external control. In Aristotle's sense, each local government may, and often will, have a ruling class of its own, once independent and now subject to or participant in a ruling class of the new more comprehensive political unit. Looked at historically and analytically, there is a continuum between the

independent small governments of one period and the local governments embraced in the empires and nation-states of succeeding epochs. The cycle of building larger aggregates may halt and reverse itself, bringing about the renewed independence of lesser communities; or both the process of aggregation and that of disintegration may go forward at the same time, interacting together. Thus the study of state formation and international relations joins hands with the study of local government.

Secession, separatism, colonial nationalism, revolution, and imperialism are pervasive categories of political analysis. The ethical self-sufficiency of the community and the supremacy and independence of its ruling class are two aspects of statehood that local governments approach as limits. If they are attained, local governments become independent states; if lost, they become incorporated in larger units.

Ethical self-sufficiency means in practice that a political community possesses ideal goals whose significance for the politically decisive part of the community transcends the goals of any more or less inclusive community. The supremacy of the ruling class is derived from its commonly accepted relation to those goals from which it derives its legitimized power. In practice, the community may possess both ethical self-sufficiency and a ruling class of its own and still fail of political independence. The captivity of the Jews under Babylon and Rome is a case in point. Ireland and Poland in recent history were incorporated as foreign bodies into alien sovereignties. But in Hobbes' terms they indeed formed "worms in the body politic." In any event, the material conditions of independent statehood depend in part on the surrounding facts of other powers.

The ethical self-sufficiency or the ideal goals of communities can be regarded as technologies for permitting large-scale cooperation, both by giving a decisive number of inhabitants participating roles and by structuring and legitimatizing a ruling class and its roles—creating an area and a personnel with shared legitimate power. The possibility of creating such goals with an appropriate

ruling group is decisive not only for the creation of larger state structures in the international sphere, but equally for the solution of metropolitan problems internally. Of course, in either the international or the domestic sphere, problems may be "solved" by the force of conquest or fiat. Even here, however, the transformation of might into an accepted and acceptable right remains.

#### IV

The inappropriateness, for the solution of major current problems, of our existing structure of state and local governments is a common lament of citizen, scholar, and public official. The satellite suburb entrenched in its baneful legal autonomy, the rotten-borough state, the under-represented urban population, all exemplify the conflict between the dynamics of change and the statics of a vested interest in the institutional status quo, with its passing ideals and its challenged power structure. Just as internal local government structures are menaced by the sweep of change, so the international state structure itself, in its embodiment of a bygone distribution of power and purposes, is challenged by new and legally unrecognized facts and forces.

The process of adjustment of institutional structure to the emerging new facts of life may proceed more peacefully within states, where there exists a more or less accepted mechanism for the transfer of power, than between states, where commonly accepted instrumentalities for adjustment and the saving of face are lacking. In the extreme case, and always as a real alternative, there remains the possibility of revolution in the one case and war in the other. A major achievement of political institutions is to make possible the non-violent adaptation of the status quo to the necessities of change.

Edward Hallett Carr, in his *Twenty Years Crisis*, has well expressed the problem of politics as the institutionalization of peaceful change. In this sense war and revolution are extreme means necessitated by the failure of institutions to adapt to major new facts of power. One does not have to share in Carr's apparent



worship of the "bitch goddess success" to appreciate the force of this position. From it, as from that of Marx and Aristotle, the assumption of the normality of "social harmony," that underlies much economic and political analysis, seems naive, hypocritical, or pollyanna. Thus a study of American politics that focuses on parties and elections is, while important, radically insufficient, open to the same criticism that Marx leveled at the economists. It assumes the permanence of the system and therefore neglects the dynamics of its structure. It neglects the dynamics of political structure. The evisceration of politics by abstracting from it vital Aristotelian elements, now isolated in sociology and economics, accounts in part for the emptiness and insufficiency of analysis.

For Aristotle the ruling class and revolution were two of the main concepts of political analysis. Investigation guided by these concepts inevitably leads to concern for the realities of social power, its acquisition, distribution, limits, transfer, and loss. Power capabilities, a term we glibly bandy about in the analysis of international relations, has equal meaning in terms of local, state, and national government. The process of political change can be fruitfully viewed from the standpoint of changes in the composition and techniques of the ruling class, its relation to the value symbols of the society, and the dynamics of economic and cultural change.

There is certainly room for the important study of the politics and technology of cooperation. In the larger sense, however, this is a subcategory of the greater process of the dynamics of group adjustment. And even in the study of supposedly instrumental politics—as for example the fringe problem of metropolitan cities—the structure of a local ruling class and the possibility of galvanizing it into effective action is a decisive element for success. The differing fortunes of urban redevelopment in Pittsburgh—where the Mellon family and its leading scion, Richard Mellon, exert an effective hegemony—and in those communities with a jealous group of contending notables bear witness to the very every-

day and very practical consequences of the structure of the local ruling class.

The emergence of labor leaders as powerholders without social status constitutes a source of instability for local constitutions and local ruling classes. Whether they will be crushed or ignored, or admitted to the country clubs and the honor-laden posts of our society, is on the agenda of history. The nationality leaders, from the Boston Irish to the Slavonians, have fought a long-drawn battle for inclusion into the upper ranks of the status system. When Harvard College conferred an honorary degree on Cardinal O'Connell of Boston the reconciliation of State Street with Lake Street was finally ratified.

The basic adjustment of the ruling class to new facts of power, compelling the admission of new elements and signaling the decline of old, is not always easy, and sometimes is violent. The La Follette Civil Liberties Committee records the violent objection to the emergence of union power.

Sometimes the problems of intergroup adjustment approximate those with which we are painfully familiar in international life. The Negro population strains at the dikes of segregation with all the pent-up energy of a nation seeking its place in the sun. Quite literally it seeks to conquer living space, space that cannot be purchased. Violence is a technique that lies ready at hand. Despite feelings of guilt, in terms of both the plutocratic principle of justice—they have the money—and the democratic principle—they are fellow citizens—those next to the problem, feeling menaced, deny Negroes membership in a community controlled by these principles. The prevention of warfare depends on the institutionalized technique of mobilizing the neutrals.

But the solution will require granting the same accolade to the Negro leaders that has been accorded other nationality groups by the ruling class. Failing that, the Negroes would remain a community within a community, struggling for a recognition that can finally be accorded only by the ruling class. In an important

sense the Negroes as a group are excluded from becoming fully participating citizens, and thus are fair game for the revolutionary appeal of communists and alien agents. Symbolic participation in community acceptance, through the leaders' attainment of social-status positions, is a major attribute of citizenship in a mass state. Thus the ruling class becomes a medium for the representation of groups and the resolution of their conflicts. It may be a far more significant center of representation than city council or legislature.

The composition, interrelation, and changes of local ruling classes give significance to the local election returns. The president of the Central Labor Union Council and the archbishop do not change with the elections. What difference, then, do the elections make? How does the apparent change in formal political power relate to and affect the real distribution of social power? The political institutions are not only a device for doing the day-by-day work of meeting commonly accepted needs; they are also a mechanism for facilitating the peaceful readjustment of the balance of social power. The legal structure may obstruct or facilitate this. It may be more accessible to some groups, some levels of government, some agencies of government than to others, in their struggle for recognition and change. And the contest will be carried on in private organizations whose decisions may frequently outweigh the public in importance.

The concept of the ruling class provides a corrective for the superficialities of the formal legal order as a true description of the actualities of political power; and the Aristotelian analysis of revolutions provides a more searching analysis of political process than our preoccupation with formal elections. The seeming inapplicability of city-state experience to the macroscopic phenomena of the nation-state has served to limit Aristotelian analysis to the office of a profound but tenuous philosophic inspiration.

That this should have occurred despite the deep appreciation of early American theorists for the classic categories of analysis is in all probability due to the great appeal of both the facts and the myth of classless society. As Professor Hartz has pointed out,

American experience has been peculiar in having a democratic revolution without the necessity of overthrowing a feudal order. The absence of class consciousness may well be due, as Professor Hartz contends, not only to the bounty of nature but even more to the fact that the middle class, never made class-conscious by struggle with a nobility, has failed to tutor the workers in their "historic" role.

Surely a part of the reason for the failure of political science to make use of the concept of the ruling class is the disrepute of Marxism and its works, and the crudity of much of vulgar Marxism. The Italian realists, such as Mosca, have remained curiosities from which to quote an occasional line with approval, but despite even the enormous vogue of Pareto they have failed to stimulate systematic study and reorientation. Elite studies there have been, but these have had the appearance of being esoteric when they have not been damned as antidemocratic.

The Aristotelian conceptions of citizen, constitution, and ruling class can be transferred from the city-state to an examination of the phenomena of government at local, state, and national levels, and even of politics, including the international. To raise the question of who are citizens, and in what sense, at each level of government, is to pin-point crucial political issues that legal categories neglect and obscure. A functional conception of citizenship is as fruitful as a functional conception of party membership.

That a city like New York may best be regarded as made up largely of resident alien merchants and mechanics, gathered for trade and pleasure, and therefore lacking in civic motivation may explain some of the necessities of its government. That the ruling class of town X are branch-plant managers taking their orders from Pittsburgh and hoping to be promoted elsewhere is a more vital political fact than the town's possession of a city-manager form of government, though the two may be related. The suburban residence of large elements of a metropolitan ruling class, and its ethos of irresponsibility, may be a more potent cause of central city disintegration than would be revealed by any analysis

of the multiplicity of legal jurisdictions. Rural domination of state legislatures and the orientation of urban masses toward Washington and the presidency are deeply related to the current institutional technique for bolstering oligarchic power.

The interrelations between the geographically separated ruling classes, the differences in their composition, the formal legal constitutions through and alongside which they operate, the varying ethics that legitimize their power, and the revolutionary movements for altering their composition, winning recognition for new elements, or overthrowing them—these are the vital stuff of politics. Their investigation can give real meaning to the shadowy phenomena of legal structures and elections, pointing to the large and cumulative phenomena and escaping the mere flux of the headlines.

## DREISER AND VEBLEN: THE LITERATURE OF CULTURAL CHANGE

BY DAVID W. NOBLE

HAVING passed the midway point of this, the most revolutionary century in history so far—indeed, having plunged precipitately toward the ever nearing future—Americans are greatly conscious of a need to understand what has passed so quickly. They must know in order to have some sense of the world that is and that so soon will be. One of the major traditional disciplines which influences widely varied students of American culture is history, and no aspect of history is more pertinent to students of American culture than intellectual history. And yet, while many practice intellectual history throughout the various disciplines, few have been concerned with attempts to refine the concepts and tools of this study.

This in itself is far from an evil, because there is a clear danger of a specialization of outlook which reaches the absurdity of coming to overlook the purpose of that specialization: namely, the clarification of the total culture. One wonders, however, why so many students of intellectual history, whether professional historians or others, have consistently avoided the concept of "climate of opinion," which Carl Becker used so effectively a quarter of a century ago in his study of the Enlightenment.<sup>1</sup> Certainly this concept is not an overspecialized research tool, entangled in its own professionalized jargon.

As Becker used the term, borrowed from Whitehead, it merely means looking at ideas within the context of a specific historically defined society. For Becker, ideas operate on two levels. There

<sup>1</sup> Carl Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers* (New Haven 1932).

are technical ideas, consciously held and elaborated into logical patterns. And then there are ideas that have the quality of faiths. They are the instinctively, unconsciously held ideas about nature and God and society. They are the real philosophical structure of an age, because they give final meaning to the world. Within the framework of such preconceptions, men do their conscious and so-called rational thinking.

Becker's book was written to demonstrate this thesis. Taking the Enlightenment, he distinguished between the avowed ideas of the *philosophes* and the faiths that structured their world. The eighteenth-century intellectual had verbally accepted a positivistic tradition of science as a guide for understanding the world. Nothing was true or good if it did not coincide with empirical fact. And Becker suggested what a magnificent weapon this was to destroy the established historical position of the *ancien régime* and its historically defined political, social, and religious values. But then, Becker declared, when the *philosophes* turned to offering alternative values to society, they built them around the same inherited mediaeval Christian tradition and view of the world. The Heavenly City of the philosophers was to be rooted in this world, but it was merely a secularized version of that synthesized by St. Thomas.

Becker's philosophical implication for intellectual history, therefore, was that one must consider man's preconceptions, emotionally held, as basic, and that one should not accept explicit ideas as the gauge of the man or the times. Almost inevitably, technical ideas will be bent to fit the inherited attitudes. A further implication then follows that if there are to be major changes in ideas, whereby one society will be distinguished from another in time, such changes will be in the area of preconceptions, which are the real climate of opinion of an age. And, finally, he implied that such changes cannot be instituted by dependent technical ideas, but will come as fundamental changes in social structure force a change in the climate of opinion.

This is hypothesis, and the present article is not written to



defend its total philosophical validity but is a case of special pleading, asking that those interested in American culture make greater use of the hypothesis. There is nothing to lose but our preconceptions. And interesting hypothetical examples may be advanced in its behalf.

## I

One of the pioneering attempts to come to grips with America at midcentury is Henry Steele Commager's *The American Mind* (1950). Surprisingly, it is a book that has not been attacked in force by literary people, although the author's analysis is that American literature in the twentieth century has been bankrupt. Or perhaps it is not surprising: perhaps the literary world accepts Professor Commager's conclusion; or perhaps, even more likely, the literary world has ignored the writing of an historian. But, for those interested in American culture, it is a book that cannot be ignored. It stands as a major effort in present intellectual history, and its methods and attitudes should be more explicitly accepted or rejected.

Professor Commager has criticized American literature because it has not served the function of educating Americans to the new world of the twentieth century. This world was begun in the 1890s. "The decade of the nineties," he writes, "is the watershed of American history." "On the one side lies an America predominantly agricultural . . . conforming . . . to the political, economic, and moral principles inherited from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries . . . On the other side lies the modern America, predominantly urban and industrial . . . and trying to accommodate its traditional institutions and habits of thought to conditions new and in part alien . . . The neat, orderly universe of the Enlightenment . . . was disintegrating under the blows of Darwinian evolution, the new physics, and the new biology; and philosophers, baffled or disillusioned in their search for universal laws, contented themselves with analyses of its fragmentary and fortuitous manifestations."

And the artists failed to accept responsibility for clarifying the new human condition. Instead they clung tenaciously to pre-1890 ideas of scientific determinism, which removed from their shoulders any responsibility for holding society together during those trying days of earthshaking change: "... they shifted the responsibility for the sorry mess into which mankind had drifted from society itself to the cosmos . . . denying free will to men, [they] placed responsibility for what seemed evil . . . on an omnipotent and inexorable Nature." Against what seems almost the treason of the literary world, Commager contrasts the exemplary behavior of the social scientists, who accepted the reality of this new order and the necessity of grappling with it.

Starting at least with the Civil War, the tremendous material transformation of the country had reached epic proportions. But this had not been accompanied by a comparable spiritual change. Seemingly, the American mind was insulated from the world of change by a traditional separation of intellectual life and everyday experience, insulated by what Santayana called the Genteel Tradition. But the inclination of the American thinker to ignore the external environment was based on more than habit. Running through the smug complacency of the Gilded Age, giving it form and substance, was a taut cable woven from a faith in progress. If the industrial revolution was the most important social and economic fact of late nineteenth-century America, a belief in progress was the most important intellectual fact.

For most Americans between 1870 and 1900, this belief in progress found sanction and expression in the evolutionary theories of Herbert Spencer, who was truly, for that generation, America's philosopher. It was Spencer who took the uneasiness, the uncertainty, out of the doctrines associated with Darwin's name. For those who wanted to know that there was a place for the deity in a world controlled by natural law, he gave the reassurance of the fact of an unknowable first cause; for the more numerous individuals who wanted the assurance of continued material progress, he affirmed that evolution means progress, that natural law is

carrying men irresistibly onward and upward; for the conservative who wished to preserve the status quo of American institutional life, he provided the quietist argument that man has no free will or ability to change the present social structure, which represents the forces of natural law; and he underwrote the conservative social philosophy of extreme individualism that postulated society as the mechanical aggregation of self-contained atomistic individuals. Complacent America, without changing its institutions or traditions, could await the fruits of unending progress.

But by the late 1890s American social scientists, discovering more incisive intellectual implications in Darwin's theories than had Spencer, began the destruction not only of Spencer but of the whole philosophy of the inevitability of progress. By 1920 these men had so revised the American intellectual world that it was impossible for the literate American to create a logical defense of inexorable progress.

Wielding a knife engraved with biting irony, this new generation demonstrated that Spencer, utilizing the prestige of Darwin's name and the mantle of modern science, had used the concept of evolution to defend the older romantic and metaphysical beliefs of Western life; his had been merely a nominal, a verbal, acceptance of new ideas. Boldly, the young men passed a verdict classing Spencer with the pre-Darwinian era of history. Brashly, they declared that a philosophy of inevitable progress was equally outdated and impossible in an age that took evolution seriously. In the modern climate of opinion, the scientific climate of opinion, the post-Darwinian climate of opinion, men could be interested only in the fact of consecutive change, in unending, meaningless process. This was the true meaning of Darwin, and this was the heart of the intellectual revolution that was now taking place.

## II

Perhaps the man who is best known as a symbol of this movement toward realism in the social sciences is Thorstein Veblen. It is Veblen who first comes to mind when the attack on Spencer and

progress is mentioned. Enthusiastically, he divided the thinkers of his day into the pre-Darwinians and the post-Darwinians. With intense precision he leveled the theories of the pre-Darwinians, such as Spencer, because their science had been based on taxonomy, on definition and classification, because it had been based on the assumption of the discoverability of first cause and final consummation and on the belief that science was the discovery of "the body of natural law, governing phenomena under the rule of causation."

Although pre-Darwinian science, continued Veblen, had emphasized the importance of facts and the placing of facts within the sequence of process, it had not been truly evolutionary, because it did not share the spiritual attitude of post-Darwinian science. The modern scientist is concerned only with the colorless impersonal sequence, but the classical economists placed their study of process within the framework of natural law. "To meet the high classical requirement, a sequence—and a developmental process especially—must be apprehended in terms of a consistent propensity tending to some spiritually legitimate end." This was, of course, what Spencer was doing; it was, indeed, the basis for a belief in progress. It was a belief that was not tenable in the light of modern scientific theory.

The ultimate implication of Darwin, Veblen insisted, was an unending, formless flux. Modern scientific theory was based on this fact, and this fact destroyed Spencerian metaphysical doctrine. There could be no inexorable laws of progress. And when this key principle was removed, the whole structure of Spencerian progress collapsed. A total philosophy of evolutionary change logically implied an historical approach to society and the individual. Spencer and the classical thinkers had postulated man as a creature of fixed qualities, controlled always by his calculation of the amount of pleasure or pain to be gained from an activity. For this school, man "has neither antecedent nor consequent. He is an isolated definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium

except for the buffets of the impinging forces that displace him in one direction or another."

This doctrine, declared Veblen, is unacceptable, not only within a broad philosophical framework, but also because modern psychology has proved it erroneous in detail. Scientifically, it can be proved that man is created by society, which is itself part of the changing stream of history. Scientifically, it can be proved that "In all the flux, there is no definitive adequate method of life and no definitive or absolutely worthy end of action." There are no universal values and there is no universal human nature.

Then, taking up these theoretical weapons of evolution, historicism, and relativism, Veblen proceeded to use them to attack the social values of the status quo which the conservative Spencerians had claimed were an expression of a necessary stage of social progress. With enthusiastic precision, he stripped the mores of middle-class America, those ornaments of the leisure class, the very best of the Genteel Tradition, of their sanctity as the highest and finest products of progressive evolution.

The decorum of the Gilded Age, he proclaimed in *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, far from being the evidence of civilization, was in truth the symbol of barbarian triumph. The manners of the leisure class, he insisted, could be traced to the age of barbarism, where it was the function of men to kill and destroy all competitors. It was the sign of the overwhelming success of the aristocracy over the common man that it could now put away the means of direct physical coercion, although slaughter and its instruments were still honorific badges of the upper class. With the poorer classes in disciplined bondage, however, the upper class could satisfy its barbaric urge to superiority in peaceful invidious distinction, in conspicuous waste and leisure, in special insignia of honor such as useless clothes and manners. For all of that, Veblen reminded his reader, these were evidences of superior strength, and the lives of the upper classes were still marked by a callous disregard of the feelings and wishes of others.

For Commager, this was exemplary responsibility, because Veblen was clearing away the dead hand of the past on the present, cutting through myth to reach a reality on which to build a solid future. "Certainly Veblen took nothing for granted, questioned everything . . . All his life he had studied how people act, not how they should act."

There now arises an interesting problem. Unavoidably, the average man of 1900 was being educated by writers like Veblen to understand that there was a growing division between the world of ideas and traditions and the new industrial environment. Veblen, for instance, is best known for the distinction he made between the attitudes of the business class and the demands of the industrial system. He related the business code of America to the historical tradition of barbarism which he had so viciously attacked in his *Theory of the Leisure Class*; it was a code based on the motive of immediate profits, which was hopelessly outdated in a complex age whose dominant theme was efficiency. Surely here is undeniable evidence that the social sciences, led by men like Veblen, had emancipated themselves from the Genteel Tradition and were providing the knowledge of the new environment necessary for a reordering of social principles and social values to coincide with this new order of things.

But had this really happened? Had the Veblens broken from the old hierarchy of social values which had rested on a belief in progress? Had they cleared the ground for a reformulation of the normative world in which men lived? Were they really engaged in a creative process that would replace inevitable progress with another value system?

Certainly, the batteries of evolution, historicism, and relativism were directed against those who believed in an innate human nature as a basis of universal values. And yet if men who held passionately to a belief in inevitable progress were suddenly challenged in that belief by the forces of industrialism, they might well react by jettisoning the peripheral elements of their value system in order to preserve the core. They might even come to believe

that the loss of the peripheral values would somehow enhance the truth of their basic postulates. And there is a great deal of evidence that this is what Veblen's generation did. Striking out at the mundane details of social life, they sought to clear the way for the most extensive period of progress the world had ever known. The seemingly destructive qualities of industrialism were the more creative as men were stripped of their inconsequentials to follow the pure truth and nothing but the truth.

Follow Veblen, therefore, into the core of one of his critical scientific essays, "The Place of Science in Modern Civilization." Listen while he relates that the nature of our culture is "peculiarly matter-of-fact," and that men have now accepted the fact that there are no ultimate values. But listen even more attentively when he asks an innocent question fraught with inconsistency: "How far is the scientific quest of matter-of-fact knowledge consonant with the inherited intellectual aptitudes and propensities of the normal man?" And then it is indeed time to follow Veblen to a place which he vehemently denied existence—to his hidden belief in a normal man, a man above and outside historical change. Once this fundamental presupposition of the existence of a normal man is accepted as part of Veblen's climate of opinion, an entire philosophy of primitivism emerges from what have always been classed as incongruous elements in his writings.

Yes, Veblen talked in terms of fixed social stages of savagery, barbarism, and civilization; and, yes, he associated the present flowering of civilization with the innate qualities of the primitive man. "It may seem a curious paradox," he wrote, "that the latest and most perfect flowering of western civilization is more nearly akin to the spiritual life of the serfs and villeins than it is to that of the Grange or the Abbey." It was no paradox, however, as Veblen made clear: because his anthropology postulated a natural man in the era of savagery who was motivated by certain social instincts that led him into purposeful, constructive cooperation with his fellows; because his history postulated that this savage, altruistic nature had been submerged in the next stage of social



evolution, barbarism, by the aristocrats who, living by an historically acquired set of psychological habits, were not normal men; because his faith in progress postulated that throughout history the common man had retained his original, primitive nature, which was much stronger than the barbarian traits that represented merely a passing historical era, "the habits derived from the predatory and quasi-peaceable culture," and "relatively ephemeral variants of certain underlying propensities and mental characteristics of the race."

In *The Theory of Business Enterprise* Veblen made clear the manner in which modern industrial conditions were destroying these barbarian qualities. Inevitably, he affirmed, "the machine discipline acts to disintegrate the institutional heritage of all degrees of antiquity and authenticity . . . It thereby cuts away that ground of law and order on which business enterprise is founded." This discipline, he continued, brings about the intellectual environment of post-Darwinian science, because it "enforces a standardization of conduct and knowledge in terms of quantitative precision, and inculcates a habit of apprehending and explaining facts in terms of material cause and effects. It involves a valuation of facts, things, relations, and even personal capacity, in terms of force. Its metaphysics is materialism and its point of view is that of causal sequences." This had the effect that "The mechanically trained classes, trained to matter-of-fact habits of thought, show a notable spontaneity in the construction of new myths or conventions as well as in the reconstruction of the old."

But then the modern man did not need new myths or conventions, because, stripped of the weight of barbarian culture, his savage nature with an innate set of values was reappearing. This, in turn, is the message of Veblen's key book, *The Instinct of Workmanship*. Savage man had the instinct of workmanship, which leads to high economic productivity and pride of work; the instinct of parental bent, which is broader than family solidarity and leads to broad humanitarianism and concern for the welfare of the whole community; and idle curiosity, which is the basis

of all true, scientific knowledge. When the primitive social group became confused in the complexity of civilization, these instincts contaminated one another, and this allowed their perversions, the barbarian qualities that mark our business culture, to take control. The discipline of the machine, however, is reviving these instincts, by reestablishing on a worldwide scale the solidarity of the smaller social groups of savagery. The matter-of-factness of the machine is strengthening idle curiosity and the instinct of workmanship; the destruction of class divisions and the establishment of group solidarity is reinforcing the parental bent.

The coming of industrialism to America had meant initial confusion as business culture disintegrated, but it meant an increasing and, finally, a culminating society of perfect order, based on the natural altruism and social solidarity of the primitive man. Once before, when the collapse of the Roman empire had brought complete social disintegration, "The pride of caste and all the principles of differential dignity and honor fell away, and left mankind naked and unashamed and free to follow the promptings of hereditary savage human nature which make for fellowship and Christian charity." Now this was happening again, with the added assurance that the machine discipline would restrain the contamination of man's instincts.

Veblen modified, at times even denied, this extreme optimism, but the central theme of his writings, the logical arguments he used, all pointed directly to the paradox that the increasing complexity of American life was really an increasing simplicity, that industrial progress meant a return to primitive solidarity. It is also arguable that the majority of the social scientists of Veblen's generation followed him in this paradox of progress and primitivism, in spite of the acceptance of evolution and historical relativism.<sup>2</sup>

It is clear that the American social philosophers, drawn from

<sup>2</sup> See David W. Noble, "The Paradox of Progressive Thought," in *American Quarterly* (Fall 1953), and "Veblen and Progress: The American Climate of Opinion," in *Ethics* (Summer 1955).

the ranks of the social sciences and technical philosophy, retained their fundamental allegiance to a faith in an irresistible progress up to the catastrophe of World War I. They did this by forcing their technical ideas into strange patterns, and by ignoring the actual behavior of men in the new urban-industrial communities. They are, indeed, a perfect example of the Genteel Tradition, as they blandly coerced experience into the mold of abstract thought. The fundamental, the inescapable fact of World War I, a war that had not been included in the vision of utopia, succeeded in finally undermining the foundations of this castle in the air. It did so at the price of a debilitating confusion on the part of those who had held the true faith.

The new technical, scientific, and philosophical ideas had not been used as tools to understand a new environment that challenged the social pattern and values by which progress had been defined. Instead they were taken as the foundations of the homogeneous cooperative commonwealth itself; the word was to become the fact. And so Americans were not informed by their technical social philosophers of the possibility of the disintegration of their controlling myth, until 1917 transformed possibility into actuality.

### III

If the people had listened, however, they might have heard such a warning from many of the generation of artists who took the stage in 1900. And our symbolic figure here is Theodore Dreiser. It is Dreiser who is most often paired with Veblen as a literary representative of the new philosophy of naturalism which had swept through the social sciences. But he is usually placed on this lofty pinnacle with a note of apology by literary people.

The literary historian confesses that Dreiser, though he attacked the smug and stilted hypocrisies of the middle class in the same general realistic way as Veblen did, had none of the precision of his academic contemporary, none of the razor-sharp intellectual weapons, none of the penetrating and informed understanding of the situation's historical background. Worst of all, he had no

grasp of the intellectual revolution through which he was living; he was striking out blindly and blunderingly, handicapped by the formal philosophy he retained, a philosophy borrowed from Spencerian sources. For Commager, Dreiser was a confused determinist whose writings reflect much of the emphasis of the mechanism of Haeckel. Commager thus accepts Dreiser's avowed debt to both Spencer and Haeckel. Dreiser related that their ideas, when he read them in his youth, "blew him to bits"; this was a lasting impression, providing the philosophy of determinism that would inform his books almost throughout his career.

Dreiser, then, was almost a generation behind the sweep of American intellectual life. The unsophisticated Dreiser took up Spencerian philosophy when the country's best minds had moved beyond it. His specific errors in the light of the advances made by men like Veblen are legion. He accepted the notion that man is controlled by physical law when his philosophic contemporaries had moved on to the position that human nature is largely outside the influence of the physical environment and is, rather, shaped by social forces. He accepted the sensationalism of the pleasure-pain calculus when social psychologists were emphasizing that human nature is extremely complex and that its motives to action change with the values learned from its social environment. He accepted the position of atomic individualism, that society is a mechanical aggregation of isolated, self-contained individuals, when sociologists were proclaiming the unity of social life and the impossibility of an atomic individual, since human nature is itself a social product. In short, if the historian of ideas is searching for a manifestation of some philosophic or scientific theory in Dreiser's literature, he will be confronted with what the sociologists of a generation ago called cultural lag, the delayed filtering down of advanced ideas from their first exponents to the rest of the community.

This is one way of interpreting Dreiser's place in the history of ideas. It is one level of criticism which can be used when he is compared to those contemporaries like Veblen who had rejected

Spencer. Nevertheless, in spite of this argument and its supporting evidence, one cannot escape questioning that it was Dreiser rather than Veblen who continued to express the traditions of Spencer's generation.

Veblen, beneath all the sound and fury that he directed at Spencer's specific concepts on man and nature, clung to the heart of Spencer's position—a determined process of progress. And because of this continued faith, he could not provide his readers with a real working knowledge of the revolutionary implications of industrialism; he could not direct attention to the latent consequences of the new material order; he did little to focus attention on the problem men would have of keeping order in a world in which the individual had lost his sense of belonging to a firm and supporting social framework. Is it not Dreiser, then, rather than Veblen who speaks for a new generation and a new appraisal of the world? Is it not Dreiser who has rejected the heart if not the details of Spencer's philosophy—his belief in an inevitable and controlled progress? Is it not Dreiser who interprets the coming of industrialism as a truly autonomous and unpredictable force, not controlled and channeled by an all-pervasive progress, as it had been for Spencer and Veblen?

Almost without exception the academic social philosophers of the progressive period came from small-town or rural backgrounds. They were not directly influenced in the formative years of their youth by the new forces of industrialism or urbanism. Dreiser, on the other hand, developed emotionally within the most extreme conditions of the new order that was supposed to precipitate the forces of progress into more complete expression. Child of an immigrant family that seemed to belong nowhere in the post-Civil-War world, he watched his isolated father disintegrate spiritually under the pressure of the unsettled urban industrial economy of the 1870s and 1880s. Dreiser watched him disintegrate under the pressure of impersonal forces that continued to press against the only unity Dreiser knew, his family, until it too dissolved into formlessness and emptiness as its mem-

bers drifted apart, lost from contact in the anonymity of cities that were everywhere so much the same.

The machine process, a Veblen would say, was obliterating the institutional framework of the past; it was grinding down the old world of values, including the family. But beyond destruction and despair Veblen saw emancipation, because man, freed from his commitments to the partial and narrow and incomplete loyalties of the past, would now merge with all the members of the community in mutual affection and solidarity. Dreiser did not, could not, believe that this social dissolution preceded social consolidation. The collapse of society had to be accepted at face value, resulting in loneliness and insecurity and fierce competition for the individual. And his experience in the newspaper world of the midwestern cities of Chicago and St. Louis, in the eastern cities of Pittsburgh and New York, did nothing to alter this feeling.

Man was essentially a solitary animal struggling for survival in a world governed by a cold impersonality. Believing this and aspiring to artistic expression, Dreiser could not readily have understood or appreciated the revolutionary academic ideas of the 1890s that proclaimed man's freedom from physical law: man's social nature and social freedom. Rather, it was from the tradition of Huxley and Spencer that he found technical theories to express his experience. But he accepted these on affective, not on logical grounds. He was selective: he ignored Spencer's promise of unending progress and chose to think that man was a prisoner of natural forces that had no direction and no culmination. Now he had philosophic justification for his belief that "of one's ideals, struggles, deprivation, sorrows and joys, it could only be said that they were chemic compulsions, something which for some inexplicable but unimportant reason responded to and resulted from the hope of pleasure and the fear of pain. Man was a mechanism, undevised and uncreated, and a badly and carelessly driven one at that."

With justification but also ironically, it is Dreiser, then, who

is criticized for making his characters unhistorical, for catching them up in the control of natural laws, for explaining their actions in terms of their "chemisms." Supposedly, Dreiser had no sense of the social conditioning of his individuals, of the historical complexities that make understandable the uniqueness of each individual's experience. And yet, just as Veblen consciously supported a philosophy of historicism and unconsciously expressed an ahistorical position, it is possible that Dreiser, in spite of his predilection for natural law, expressed a world of historical individuals. Indeed, the America described by Dreiser in *Sister Carrie* is an entirely different world from that of Thorstein Veblen.

Veblen wrote that life is without ultimate meaning, but he ordered it with a rigid discipline. Middle-class mores were not desperately held badges of status, clutched at to provide security in a truly fathomless cosmos; they were the solid facts of barbarian behavior. And the members of the lower class, who in the future would be equated with society itself, carried the instincts of workmanship, of idle curiosity, of parental bent, which would provide the ultimate criteria for the meaning of existence.

Opposed to this, Dreiser presented two characters who can dramatically serve as symbols for Veblen's class traits. *Sister Carrie* is concerned with the decline of Hurstwood, a middle-class man, and the rise of Carrie, a lower-class girl. Somehow it was Dreiser, who had no theory of the social nature of man, who provided a much more compelling portrait of the condition of man in the new world of the city; somehow it was Dreiser who provided, in a moving manner, the histories of individuals caught up in a society that had lost its capacity to believe in the values that gave it order and continuity.

Carrie, on her arrival in Chicago, has none of the socially inculcated morality of the middle class. But, free from this grip, she evidences none of the social instincts Veblen attributed to the lower class. Indeed, if she has an instinct, it is only that of self-preservation. Essentially lonely and incapable of close human associations, she is nevertheless fascinated by the life and possi-



bilities of the city. And she reaches out for the obvious middle-class symbols of prestige, such as clothes, not in the spirit of conspicuous waste, but for the strength they might add to her solitary position. Capable of a limited personality development, endowed with a certain circumscribed strength of character, she is motivated neither by extreme selfishness nor by loyalty. Her rise in the world in financial terms is made possible because of her natural gifts, but is brought about, in the final analysis, by chance acquaintances and occurrences. Throughout her upward progress she makes no lasting human contacts, and fails to reach the security of a final social equilibrium. When left at last at the pinnacle of her small success, she is surrounded by the same circle of meaninglessness as when we first met her, because, in Veblen's terms, she has neither the support of lower-class instincts nor that of middle-class mores. Success in a world that is crumbling is necessarily solitary and momentary.

In *Hurstwood*, the second protagonist of the story, Dreiser was capable of creating a still more moving symbol of the ever present possibility of individual disintegration resulting from the impersonality that marked the new cities. He is the balance for Carrie in the expression of Dreiser's attitude that there was no equilibrium in the new environment, that there was a constant flux of individuals going up or down. Symbolically, *Hurstwood* must go down. Here is Dreiser's fullest sense of the truly fragile nature of security in a world undergoing dissolution. Once *Hurstwood* steps out of the protection of his middle-class niche, once he exposes himself to the completely cold and heartless anonymity that forms the endless sea around the infinitesimal island of middle-class meaning, he is hopelessly lost. There is not enough middle-class solidarity, not enough class consciousness, to motivate other middle-class men to try to save him.

Here too is personal tragedy, because *Hurstwood*, having lost the dignity, the respectability, of his middle-class position, has lost the qualities that had given his personality strength. In Veblen's terms, such a loss should have brought about his salva-

tion because, for the first time, his innate, universal human nature of social service and social solidarity would have the opportunity to flower out; or he would find support from a solidarist lower class that would sympathize with a newfound comrade. Instead, without the supporting elements of his previous environment, Hurstwood ceases to have personality or character and steadily disintegrates as a person until his death ends his intolerable isolation.<sup>3</sup>

It is arguable that *Sister Carrie* would have been a greater work of art if Dreiser had not been handicapped by many of the specific technical concepts of the Spencerian world. More important for the argument under review here, however, is the fact that, as an artist, Dreiser transcended these technicalities and wrote a novel with living individuals, whose personalities express with sensitivity their historical environment and do not reflect merely the abstract motivations of "chemisms." One can learn much of the nature and structure of American society in 1900 from the pages of *Sister Carrie*. In emphasizing the disintegrating social effects of the new industrial order, Dreiser taught his contemporaries what they had not yet come to see in their environment.

Here is the possibility of literature performing a creative role in changing the basic values of society when it has become an absolute necessity for such a change to take place. Dreiser did not give us a picture of the world as it actually existed. Most Americans were not so divorced from society as were Carrie and Hurstwood. What was important about Dreiser's exaggeration, however, was its possible ultimate relation to the value structure of his society. Dreiser's destructive theme was a direct challenge to the idea of progress, which was the major value or myth of his culture. In giving a onesided knowledge of the new industrial world, he was also creating the basis for a new value structure

<sup>3</sup> Much of this analysis of *Sister Carrie* depends on the essays by James T. Farrell, Eliseo Vivas, and Charles C. Walcutt, contained in *The Stature of Theodore Dreiser*, ed. by Alfred Kazin and Charles Shapiro (Bloomington 1955).

to accompany this environmental change, by destroying the myths of the current culture.

It was the overwhelming experience of World War I, and not the writings of the academic social philosophers or the literary men, which brought the American intellectual to question the fact of progress at the basic, the fundamental, level of emotion. But this experience merely emphasized the message of the writers like Dreiser, who had already suggested in affective terms the destructive possibilities of the new environment in negating human relationships.

One may hope, therefore, that historians of ideas will in the future focus their attention less exclusively on the concepts of technical philosophy and science, and increasingly appreciate the dynamic importance of literary and, indeed, all artistic expression in illuminating the mainstream of intellectual history—an illumination that is fundamental to understanding, because it not so much reflects as creates history. And one way in which they may approach this goal is through a reappraisal of Becker's suggestive use of the concept of climate of opinion.

## CYCLES IN CLIMATE OF OPINION

IT APPEARS to me that intellectual history moves in cycles. I am inclined to accept the sixty-year cycle with a subordinate thirty-year cycle. Sixty years ago the intellectual world had grown tired of Mill and Spencer, Tennyson and George Eliot. New lights were brightening above the eastern horizon—the Pragmatists, Shaw, Dreiser, Veblen. The younger generation today finds it hard to understand the enthusiasm with which the younger generation of half a century ago hailed *Man and Superman*, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, *Sister Carrie*. Nor can the oldest generation today warm up to its original enthusiasm. I have recently tried to reread *Man and Superman* and *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. I can't; but I can manage somehow to read Dreiser, who, as Dr. Noble points out, comes nearer surviving than Veblen.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century many writers were picking flaws in the semi-theological conception of progress as inherent in the world order. Veblen, Shaw, and Dreiser pushed the revolt against "progress" to its logical conclusion, a blind flux devoid of preference for good or evil. Yet the three logicians could not rest content with meaningless flux. Each in his own way tried to invent a progress to fill the void left by the collapse of Spencerian progress. Shaw had recourse to anarchistic socialism, Veblen to the instinct of workmanship and the growing power of engineering; Dreiser's utopia was never clearly wrought out, but it pieces together as an equalitarian humanism.

I once heard Veblen speak with friendly contempt of Jane Addams and other "do-gooders." They were not in line with the advancing hegemony of the engineers. But in the course of a half century the do-gooders mushroomed out into the welfare state and the worldwide movement for the abolition of poverty and for higher standards of living. The engineers are indeed advancing toward economic control, but instead of abolishing the "price system," as Veblen expected them to do, they are refining the price system and making it a better instrument of social organization. Progress, indeed, but through the force of human will.

In the present voluntaristic climate of opinion Dreiser survives best of the three, partly because Shaw and Veblen were egoists, wholly contained within their own systems, while Dreiser was merely an egotist whose art, imperfect as it was, reached beyond himself to the continuities of human life.

ALVIN JOHNSON

# RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS IN SWITZERLAND

BY KURT MAYER

**S**HORTLY after the end of World War II, Switzerland began to experience an unexpectedly strong resurgence of foreign immigration, which has been gaining momentum ever since. In any small country a sizable influx of aliens is likely to have important effects on the growth and composition of the population. In Switzerland, where the total population of 5 million is culturally heterogeneous, this becomes especially evident. It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the significance of the postwar flow of Swiss immigration, and to trace its effects on the demographic and social structure of the country's population.<sup>1</sup>

## I

Immigrants have come to Switzerland during all ages; the central geographical location and the close cultural connection with the neighboring countries have always facilitated a certain amount of immigration. Prior to the nineteenth century, however, the extent of this influx was very limited. Suffering from a continuous pressure of the native population on the scanty natural resources, Switzerland was primarily an emigration country. From 1400 to 1800 the Swiss migration balance was negative, with many times more emigrants than immigrants.<sup>2</sup> In the nineteenth century the population pressure began to ease; as Switzerland became industrialized the flow of migration ceased to be onesided. To be sure, upward of half a million Swiss have left their native land

<sup>1</sup> An abridged version of this paper was read at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, held in Philadelphia, May 4-5, 1957. I am indebted to Dr. Albert Koller, Director of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, for making available to me some unpublished materials, especially his mimeographed paper, "Die Ausländer in der schweizerischen Bevölkerung" (Locarno 1954).

<sup>2</sup> See Kurt B. Mayer, *The Population of Switzerland* (New York 1952) Chapter 5.

during the last 150 years, but they have been replaced by a continuous stream of immigrants eager to take their place.

The influx of aliens started gradually at first, but the tide began to swell rapidly after 1850, when railroad building and industrial expansion provided abundant work for a growing army of industrial laborers and construction workers. The extent of the immigration movement cannot be ascertained exactly, because Swiss migration statistics, like those of all other countries, are fragmentary and defective. But the movement of aliens can be gauged at least approximately: on the basis of census, vital, and naturalization statistics, the net immigration balance of aliens has been calculated for each intercensal period since 1870 by the Federal Statistical Office. The figures derived by this method are presented in Table 1.

They show that the flow of immigrants, which had been well under way, decreased sharply during the 1880s. This reversal was caused by the severe agricultural crisis that affected Switzerland, like other Western European countries, in the late 70s and early 80s, when the perfection of railroad and steamship transportation

TABLE 1. Net Immigration of Aliens and Total Population Increase in Switzerland, 1870-1950 \*

<i>Years</i>	<i>Net Immi- gration of Aliens</i>	<i>Total Population Increase</i>	<i>Net Alien Immigra- tion in % of Total Population Increase</i>
1870-1880	45,000	176,780	25.5%
1880-1888	5,040	85,968	5.9
1888-1900	127,096	397,689	32.0
1900-1910	131,251	437,850	30.0
1910-1920	-109,605	127,027	...
1920-1930	18,096	186,080	9.7
1930-1941	- 56,105	199,303	...
1941-1950	113,522	449,285	25.3

\* Computed from *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1955.

resulted in the flooding of Western markets with cheap grains from Eastern Europe and from overseas. Agricultural prices broke sharply, and tens of thousands of Swiss farmers, unable to meet an unbeatable competition, abandoned their farms and emigrated to the United States. In fact, during the eight years between the censuses of 1880 and 1888 some 92,000 Swiss citizens emigrated, thereby bringing about a sharp reduction in the rate of population growth.

By 1890 the economic pendulum had swung back again, and the ensuing years, up to the outbreak of World War I, found the country so prosperous that it attracted a large immigration from neighboring and other foreign countries. A net balance of 300,000 alien immigrants within 25 years contributed more than 30 percent of the total Swiss population growth, a proportion not reached in any other European country at the time. By 1914, as will be seen presently, the number of foreign nationals had reached an estimated 600,000, or 15.4 percent of the country's total population. This unprecedented proportion of aliens aroused a considerable degree of fear and antagonism; many Swiss became greatly agitated about the real or imaginary dangers of the "foreign invasion," and the "alien problem" was one of the most hotly debated issues in Switzerland during the opening years of this century.<sup>3</sup>

The outbreak of World War I brought the heavy flow of immigration to an abrupt end. The mobilization of the European armies resulted in the rapid departure of an estimated 100,000 male aliens who left to join their colors. They were accompanied by approximately 50,000 other foreigners who left for various reasons. The number of resident aliens was thus suddenly reduced by about one-fourth. Moreover, the war ended the freedom of international migration which had prevailed all over Western and Central Europe for more than half a century. International treaties guaranteeing mutual freedom of establishment for the nationals of a score of countries were now evaded,

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter 9.



violated, or abrogated everywhere. Switzerland quickly availed herself of this unexpected opportunity to solve the "alien problem" by instituting rigorous immigration controls in 1915. These have been retained to a greater or lesser extent ever since. To be sure, those aliens who had been permanently settled in the country before 1914 were allowed to come back, but only about one-third of them returned.<sup>4</sup>

In contrast to the pre-1915 laissez-faire conditions, aliens (other than bona fide tourists) who wish to enter the country for purposes of gainful employment must now obtain the permission of the Swiss authorities. The policy has been to grant permission only to foreigners whose skills are in short supply among the native labor force. Moreover, most of the permits are issued merely for limited periods of time; only a small proportion of the immigrants are granted the right of permanent establishment.

As can be seen from Table 1, the stringent restrictions sharply reduced the influx of aliens in the interwar years. The net immigration of aliens was positive during the 1920s, but it amounted to only 18,000 persons for the whole decade, a small fraction of the prewar totals. During the depression of the 1930s large-scale unemployment caused a further tightening of the controls, and after the outbreak of World War II, military conscription, disruption of trade, and other war exigencies once more resulted in a net exodus of approximately 50,000 aliens who returned to their countries of origin. As a result, the alien migration balance of the 1930-41 intercensal period ended with a substantial net loss.

On the other hand, the war uprooted large numbers of Swiss citizens residing abroad: about 80,000 Swiss nationals returned from abroad between 1939 and 1949. Many of them had lost all their possessions and had to be assisted by a federal repatriation commission. In addition, Switzerland provided temporary shelter for a large number of foreign refugees, granting asylum to a total of 295,000 civilians and military personnel between September

<sup>4</sup> See Wilhelm Bickel, "Wanderungen," in *Handbuch der schweizerischen Volkswirtschaft* (Berne 1955) vol. 1, p. 293.

1, 1939, and January 1, 1946.<sup>5</sup> Most of the foreign refugees, however, were interned in camps for the duration of the war. They were not permitted to accept gainful employment, and almost all of them left the country again after the end of the hostilities. They were not counted as part of the Swiss population in the 1941 census, and are not included in the statistics under consideration here.

A trickle of alien residents continued to leave the country throughout the war years, when Switzerland was struggling for political and economic survival. During the period between December 1, 1941, when the census was taken, and December 31, 1945, approximately 4,000 more aliens left the country than entered it.<sup>6</sup> Thereafter the tide turned once more, sharply and rather unexpectedly. Since Switzerland had remained neutral and had been spared the ravages of war, her economic situation developed very favorably after V-E day. Swiss industries were in a strategic position to supply the depleted world markets with goods, and all parts of the Swiss economy have been riding the crest of an unprecedented boom for the last ten years. Chronic unemployment disappeared during the war, giving way to a distinct and continually increasing manpower shortage. Consequently the stringent immigration restrictions have been relaxed considerably since 1946, and a large number of foreign workers have been admitted. As a result, the 1941-50 intercensal period shows a net migration gain of 113,500 aliens, the third largest on record, contributing no less than one-fourth of the total population increase during this period.

The flow of immigration has continued unabated since the last census was taken. As can be seen from Table 2, both the number of new work permits issued to foreigners and the total number of gainfully occupied aliens present in the country have increased

<sup>5</sup> Eidgenössisches Statistisches Amt, *Bevölkerungsbewegung in der Schweiz, 1943-44* (Berne 1946) p. 61\*.

<sup>6</sup> Unpublished data of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, cited by W. Bickel, *Bevölkerungsgeschichte und Bevölkerungspolitik der Schweiz* (Zurich 1947) p. 207.

TABLE 2. Gainfully Occupied Aliens with Temporary Work Permits in Switzerland, 1950-55 \*

Year	New Work Permits Issued			Tot. No. of Aliens with Permits (as enumerated each February)	Aliens Ad- mitted to Permanent Residence
	Seasonal	Non- Seasonal	Total		
1950	31,568	31,627	63,195	81,608	1,743
1951	50,008	62,890	112,898	85,349	2,176
1952	63,493	66,491	129,984	115,686	1,966
1953	71,969	66,725	138,694	123,448	2,437
1954	81,102	72,999	154,101	131,460	2,152
1955	98,446	87,317	185,763	143,406	2,594
1956				166,022	

\* Compiled from *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz, 1955*. The figures do not include aliens who cross the border in commuting daily to work, and the number of work permits is exclusive of renewals and extensions. Aliens admitted to permanent residence no longer require a work permit.

sharply from year to year. To be sure, the overwhelming majority of the newcomers are legally classified as "temporary immigrants." During the six-year period 1950-55 nearly 785,000 new work permits were issued, but half of these went to seasonal migrants, and only 13,000 gainfully occupied aliens were permitted to take up permanent residence in Switzerland during the same period. Nevertheless, since the manpower shortage continues, many of the non-seasonal work permits are regularly extended and renewed, with the result that, demographically speaking, a sizable proportion of the "temporary" immigrants have become a part of the Swiss population and affect its economic and cultural composition.

Thus the postwar influx has noticeably increased the proportion of resident aliens in the Swiss population. As can be seen from the accompanying tabulation of foreign nationals in Switzerland, their percentage has fluctuated greatly in the past century. It

Year	Number	In % of Tot. Population	Year	Number	In % of Tot. Population
1870	150,907	5.7%	1920	402,385	10.4%
1880	211,035	7.4	1930	355,522	8.7
1888	229,650	7.9	1941	223,554	5.2
1900	383,424	11.6	1950	285,446	6.1
1910	552,011	14.7	1956*	366,100	7.3
1914*	600,000	15.4			

Source: *Eidgenössische Volkszählungen*. \* Estimated.

increased rapidly from less than 6 percent in 1870 to over 15 percent in 1914, but then began to decline even more quickly, to 5 percent in 1941. At the time of the last census, in 1950, the proportion of aliens had risen again to 6 percent, and by 1956, as estimated by the present writer, it exceeded 7 percent.<sup>7</sup> Although these figures compare very favorably with those for the years before World War I, no other European country, with the exception of diminutive Luxemburg, has so high a proportion of aliens in its midst. France, Belgium, and Austria, which follow next, have 4 to 5 percent each.

## II

As would be expected, the demographic, economic, and cultural characteristics of the immigrants differ considerably from those of the Swiss citizens. Among the most striking traits of the foreigners is their unusually low sex ratio. Ordinarily, interna-

<sup>7</sup> The 1914 figure was estimated by Bickel, in *Bevölkerungsgeschichte* . . . (cited above, note 6) p. 166. The 1956 estimate was derived by the present writer as follows. The number of gainfully occupied aliens with work permits increased by 80,673 from February 1951 to February 1956. This number has been added to the total number of aliens enumerated by the census taken on December 1, 1950. The resulting figure of 366,100 represents a minimum, since it assumes that only gainfully occupied aliens have immigrated since 1950. The February 1956 population has been computed by interpolating the midyear population estimates for 1955 and 1956, published by the Federal Statistical Office. This results in an estimated population of 5,008,000 for February 1956, which is the basis used for determining the proportion of aliens.

tional migrations tend to be preponderantly masculine, and the flow of immigrants to Switzerland before World War I was no exception to this rule. The sex ratio of the aliens in 1910 was 106.9 males to 100 females, compared with 95.1 for Swiss citizens. During World War I, however, the precipitate departure of male aliens called up for military duty decisively changed the sex composition of the foreign element: by 1920 their sex ratio had dropped to 78.3. Since then the surplus of alien females has further increased: the 1950 census showed an all-time low of 69.3 foreign males to 100 foreign females, compared to a sex ratio of 94.8 for Swiss citizens. This further disturbance of the alien sex ratio was caused partly by another exodus of conscripted male aliens during World War II, but more important is the fact that the recent wave of new immigrants has been preponderantly female. Thus of the 415,658 new aliens who were granted non-seasonal work permits during the years 1949-55, females accounted for 237,830 or 57.2 percent.

The imbalance of the sexes varies with age. Immigrants tend to be youthful: 28.3 percent of the female aliens enumerated by the 1950 census were 20 to 29 years old, while only 14.0 percent of the women with Swiss nationality were in this age bracket. As a consequence, the number of "excess" female aliens in this most marriageable age group is drastic: in 1950 there were 47,703 foreign females 20 to 29 years of age, but only 24,384 foreign males. Moreover, 84.7 percent of the foreign women in this age group were single, and thus they have been giving their Swiss agemates strong competition in the marriage market. The

1886-1890	5.5%	1916-1920	10.3%	1949	11.2%
1891-1895	6.0	1921-1925	10.9	1950	12.1
1896-1900	6.8	1926-1930	10.8	1951	12.9
1901-1905	7.6	1931-1935	12.5	1952	13.9
1906-1910	8.2	1936-1940	10.4	1953	14.0
1911-1915	8.9	1941-1945	5.5	1954	14.3
		1946-1950	8.7	1955	14.7

Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz, 1955.*

accompanying figures show the rapidly rising proportion of Swiss grooms who have been marrying aliens: nowadays every seventh Swiss man weds an alien bride, a higher proportion than ever before in the history of the country. Since Swiss law provides that marriage to a Swiss husband automatically confers Swiss citizenship upon the wife (although the obverse does not apply), this "foreign infiltration" is viewed with some uneasiness by the more narrow-minded nationalists in the country. In fact, during 1950-55 the number of foreigners who were able to acquire Swiss citizenship through marriage amounted to 29,000, while only 20,000 aliens were granted this privilege in the same period through the highly selective and peculiar naturalization procedure.<sup>8</sup>

The preponderance of young women among postwar immigrants, and the low alien sex ratio generally, indicate the existence of significant differences in the economic composition of the foreign and native elements of the Swiss population. Aliens furnished 8.1 percent of the country's total labor force in 1950, and could be found in practically every occupation, but they were highly concentrated in certain specific segments of the economy. In view of the determined policy of admitting only aliens whose skills are in short supply, their occupational distribution can hardly cause much surprise. As is shown by the accompanying figures for 1950, the concentration of aliens is greatest in the domestic and personal service category. One-third of all domestic servants in Switzerland are foreigners, and one out of every five gainfully occupied aliens derives his or her livelihood from this occupation. Aliens also furnish a substantial proportion of the personnel employed by Swiss hotels and restaurants, and by institutional households; the majority of the employees in these two categories are females. Greater than average proportions of aliens are found also in the textile and clothing industries, and

<sup>8</sup> For a detailed account of the complexities and intricacies of Swiss citizenship, and the peculiarities of the Swiss naturalization procedure, see Mayer (cited above, note 2) pp. 234-36.

<i>Occupation Group</i>	<i>% in Each Occupation Group Who Are Aliens</i>	<i>% of All Gainfully Occupied Aliens</i>
Domestic and Personal Services	32.1%	20.0%
Institutional Personnel	18.6	5.9
Hotels and Restaurants	17.5	9.1
Textile Industry	11.1	5.0
Clothing and Shoe Manufacture	10.7	6.8
Construction	9.5	9.5
		56.3

Source: Computed from *Eidgenössische Volkszählung, 1950*.

in construction. Taken together, these six industry groups employ well over half—56.3 percent—of all gainfully occupied aliens, but only 31.7 percent of the Swiss citizens in the labor force.

As would be expected in the circumstances, the occupational status of the gainfully occupied aliens compares unfavorably with that of the Swiss citizens. Nearly three-quarters of the aliens are manual wage-earners, compared to 46 percent of the Swiss. Among the alien manual workers, one-quarter are skilled, compared to one-third of the Swiss manual workers. Only 9 percent of the foreigners have the status of employers or independent workers, compared to 20 percent of the Swiss, and 14 percent are salaried employees, compared to 24 percent of the Swiss. The postwar immigration has been predominantly proletarian: full employment enables the Swiss citizens to raise themselves on the occupational scale, because they can leave the most menial and least paid tasks to immigrants. This is possible because Switzerland's standard of living has long been higher than that of any other European country;<sup>9</sup> the Swiss wage level acts like a suction pump attracting migrants from less prosperous countries.

<sup>9</sup> See Statistical Office of the United Nations, *National and Per Capita Incomes of Seventy Countries in 1949 Expressed in United States Dollars*, United Nations Statistical Papers, Series E, #1 (New York 1950); also Mayer (cited above, note 2) pp. 161-64.



Although the "push" and "pull" of economic forces are powerful factors in determining the movements of individual voluntary migrants, international migration is only partially an economic phenomenon. Even in the absence of political restrictions, the influence of economic differentials is modified and tempered by a host of factors, some encouraging but others deterring migration. In the case of Switzerland, both geographic and "social" distance play an important role as selective factors in attracting immigrants. Situated in the very center of Europe, Switzerland has common boundaries with four other countries—France, Germany, Austria, and Italy—and in each case the adjoining part of Switzerland is closely related by linguistic and cultural ties with the foreign neighbor. Because of this geographic location and the intimate cultural kinship, the bulk of alien immigration has always originated in the four neighboring countries—in fact, in those provinces that abut directly on the Swiss frontiers. From 85 to 97 percent of the aliens enumerated by the Swiss census have always been citizens of the four neighboring countries, but considerable shifts have occurred in the proportion of the total constituted by each of these nationalities.

The accompanying figures show the percentage distribution of aliens in Switzerland by nationality in 1860, the first year for which this information is available; in 1910, when the crest of the prewar immigration wave was reached; and in 1950, the latest year for which census data are available. The outstanding changes

<i>Country of Origin</i>	<i>1860</i>	<i>1910</i>	<i>1950</i>
Germany	41.6%	39.8%	19.4%
France	40.5	11.5	9.6
Italy	12.0	36.7	49.1
Austria	3.2	7.1	7.8
All other countries	2.7	4.9	14.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: *Eidgenössische Volkszählungen*.

in the relative proportions of foreign nationals consist of a sharp increase of the Italians, from 12 percent in 1860 to 49 percent in 1950, and corresponding declines of the French nationals, from over 40 percent in 1860 to less than 10 percent in 1950, and similarly of Germans, from 42 to 19 percent. Noteworthy increases occurred also in the percentage of Austrians from 1860 to 1910, and of nationals of non-neighboring countries from 1910 to 1950. Unfortunately the census data also reflect some of the important territorial changes of European history, especially those involving one of the neighboring provinces: the natives of Alsace-Lorraine were enumerated as French nationals in 1860, as Germans in 1910, and again as French in 1950. Despite such inevitable distortions, these figures provide a good impression of the fluctuations that have occurred in the direction of the immigration current.

Further changes have been occasioned by the most recent additions to the foreign labor force. A breakdown by nationality of all aliens holding work permits in February 1956 reveals the following percentages: 28.8 Germans, only 4.0 French, 15.6 Austrians, 48.7 Italians, and 2.9 citizens of other countries. These figures (unlike those in Table 2) include border commuters, and are not directly comparable with census data, but they do suggest a further decline of the French element, a rapid rise in the percentage of Austrians, and a renewed increase of the Germans. But with almost half of the licensed alien workers holding Italian passports, the southern neighbors continue in the leading position that they have occupied since the beginning of World War II.

### III

To what extent has postwar immigration affected the unique equilibrium of ethnic-linguistic and religious groups which is characteristic of Swiss demography? In previous publications the present writer has pointed out that the harmonious cultural pluralism for which Switzerland has long been famous is related to the stable proportions of the major language and religious

groups in the population, proportions that have persisted for more than a century.<sup>10</sup>

Shifts in the linguistic and religious composition of the Swiss population can be ascertained only from the decennial census enumerations. In 1950, at the time of the latest census, postwar immigration had wrought only comparatively minor changes, but it is evident that the renewed influx of aliens affects the linguistic and the religious structure of the population in quite different ways. With respect to language distribution, immigration helps to counteract the effects of considerable fertility differentials; it acts as a stabilizing force. The opposite is true as regards religion: here immigration reinforces the effect of differential fertility and tends to disturb the balance.

Since 1910 language distribution has been enumerated separately for Swiss citizens and for resident aliens. As can be seen from the top panel of Table 3, small but persistent shifts have occurred in the proportions of German-speaking and French-speaking citizens. The proportion of German-speakers has increased slowly but continuously since 1910, entirely at the expense of the French-speaking citizens. This gain is primarily the result of differential fertility: between 1910 and 1950 the natural increase of the German-speaking part of the country exceeded that of the French-speaking region by 380,000 persons.<sup>11</sup> The proportions of Italian-speaking and Romansh-speaking citizens, on the other hand, have remained remarkably stable throughout.

The linguistic distribution of the alien residents contrasts sharply with that of the Swiss citizens, as can be seen from the middle panel of Table 3. Changing migratory currents have caused considerable shifts in the linguistic composition of the aliens from census to census, but at no time has German predominated to the same extent among the aliens as it has among the

<sup>10</sup> See Kurt Mayer, "Cultural Pluralism and Linguistic Equilibrium in Switzerland," in *American Sociological Review*, vol. 16 (April 1951) pp. 157-63, and *The Population of Switzerland* (cited above, note 2) Chapter 8.

<sup>11</sup> Walter Ott, "Sprache," in *Handbuch der schweizerischen Volkswirtschaft* (cited above, note 4) vol. 1, p. 260.

TABLE 3. Percentage Distribution of the Swiss Population by Language, 1910-50<sup>a</sup>

Year	German	French	Italian	Romansh	Other	Total	
						%	1000s
SWISS CITIZENS							
1910	72.7%	22.1%	3.9%	1.2%	0.1%	100%	3,201
1920	73.0	21.7	4.0	1.2	0.1	100	3,478
1930	73.7	21.0	4.0	1.2	0.1	100	3,711
1941	73.9	20.9	3.9	1.1	0.2	100	4,042
1950	74.1	20.6	4.0	1.1	0.2	100	4,430
ALIEN RESIDENTS							
1910	48.6%	15.3%	32.1%	0.2%	3.8%	100%	552
1920	52.3	17.6	25.0	0.2	4.9	100	402
1930	53.2	14.7	26.3	0.2	5.6	100	356
1941	49.1	18.1	27.7	0.4	4.7	100	224
1950	40.1	15.7	36.2	0.2	7.7	100	285
TOTAL POPULATION							
1910	69.1%	21.1%	8.1%	1.1%	0.6%	100%	3,753
1920	70.9	21.3	6.1	1.1	0.6	100	3,880
1930	71.9	20.4	6.0	1.1	0.6	100	4,066
1941	72.6	20.7	5.2	1.1	0.4	100	4,266
1950	72.1	20.3	5.9	1.0	0.7	100	4,715

<sup>a</sup> From *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1955.

citizens, while the proportion of the Italian-speakers has always been much larger among the foreigners. This became especially pronounced during the most recent intercensal period; in 1950 the percentage of Italian-speaking aliens was higher than ever before, closely approaching the proportion of German-speakers, which had reached an unprecedented low.

Despite these differences in the linguistic composition of the citizen and alien groups, foreign migrations have influenced the linguistic distribution of the total population only to a relatively minor extent. A comparison of the top and bottom panels of

Table 3 shows that the proportional representation of the four main language groups in the total population has rarely varied by more than 2 percentage points from that of the Swiss citizens only. In periods of massive immigration, however, the strong influx of Italians, as the censuses of 1910 and 1950 clearly show, tends to check the ascendancy of the German language.

But it must be pointed out that immigration is not the only factor that offsets the expansion of German. Indeed, internal migration plays a major role in preserving the traditional linguistic equilibrium. The four national languages of Switzerland are spoken in clearly defined territorial areas; the language boundaries are generally clear, even though they do not always coincide with the boundaries of political units. Each language area contains considerable numbers of residents who have migrated across the language lines and whose mother tongue therefore differs from the official language of the region where they now reside. Yet, migrants tend to become rapidly assimilated to the new language, especially through their children, who can use only the official language of the region in school.<sup>12</sup> As a matter of empirical fact, therefore, migration regularly involves an eventual change of language: the second generation no longer uses the

<sup>12</sup> In all parts of Switzerland it is established policy that only the official language of the area may be used in schools located in that area. A court decision handed down in the summer of 1956 illustrates how strictly this policy is followed. In Berne, the capital city of the Swiss Confederation, which is located in the German-speaking region, a sizable group of residents are federal civil servants whose mother tongue is French and who are employed by the civil service explicitly because of this fact: they are required to transact their daily official business in the French language. Desiring to transmit their own language to their children, these civil servants, together with others, founded some years ago a private elementary school in which instruction is given in French. Recently, finding the upkeep of this school too onerous, they petitioned first the city of Berne and then the canton of Berne for a subsidy. After their request had been denied both times, they took the case against the canton to court, pointing out that French and German are both official languages of the canton of Berne, a part of which stretches into the French language area, containing 15 percent of the canton's population. Yet the Bernese Supreme Court not only decided against the petitioners but held that even the maintenance of a private school without subsidy is a clear violation of the principle that only the official language of the area may be used in school instruction.

*Language Area* (Number of Speakers in 1000s)

<i>Language Spoken</i>	German	French	Italian	Romansh	Total
German	3,249	126	16	8	3,400
French	77	877	2	—	957
Italian	78	30	169	2	279
Romansh	14	1	1	34	49
Other	16	14	1	—	31
Total	3,434	1,048	189	44	4,715

Source: Walter Ott, "Sprache," in *Handbuch der schweizerischen Volkswirtschaft* (Berne 1955) vol. 1, p. 261. Slight discrepancies in totals are due to rounding.

tongue of its parents, and the official language of the area of residence becomes its customary language.

The accompanying tabulation shows, for 1950, the population of Switzerland by both language area and language spoken. It reveals that the various language areas differ considerably in their ability to attract migrants from other linguistic regions. In 1950 there were 171,000 residents in the French language area whose customary language was not French, but only 80,000 French-speaking individuals were living in other parts of the country. The difference of 91,000 persons must be considered a reservoir for the French language. Moreover, since this number exceeds the "reservoirs" of all other regions combined, migration to the French part of Switzerland partially counteracts the effects of lower fertility and slows down, although it does not completely stem, the relative decline in the use of the French language in Switzerland.

As far as the Italian tongue is concerned, the effects of migration are just the opposite. In 1950 there were 110,000 Italian-speakers in non-Italian parts of the country, while only 20,000 non-Italian-speaking persons had settled in the Italian language area. This geographical distribution tends to reduce the linguistic consequences of the massive influx of Italian citizens.

As a result of the linguistic assimilation of migrants, only very slight changes have occurred in the boundary lines that divide the French, German, and Italian language zones of Switzerland. (The boundary shifts when the customary language spoken by the majority of the inhabitants of a given community changes, and the community then adopts the tongue spoken by the majority as its official language.) Such minor changes as have occurred during the last hundred years have all been in favor of the French zone. The only language area that has been shrinking significantly is the region where Romansh is spoken, an ancient Latin tongue that has survived since Roman times in certain mountain valleys of the Grisons canton. Spoken in 1950 by less than 50,000 persons, of whom nearly 16,000 lived outside the region, Romansh has suffered slow encroachment by the German language. This has largely been a consequence of the tourist trade, which has brought German-speaking majorities in to some originally Romansh communities. Strenuous efforts to stem the adverse tide have been partly successful—in 1938 Romansh was elevated to the dignity of a fourth national language, through an amendment to the Swiss constitution adopted by popular referendum—but the ultimate survival of this language remains in doubt.

Turning now to the analysis of changes in the religious composition, it is relevant to remember that most of the immigrants originate from the adjoining provinces of the four neighboring countries. Since the Catholic religion predominates in all adjacent areas, the religious distribution of the alien residents has always differed sharply from that of the Swiss citizens. Switzerland played an important part in the Reformation, and some parts of the country accepted the new doctrine while others rejected it. The religious differences between Catholics and Protestants gave rise to prolonged and often violent dissension and internal strife, which was finally overcome only after the victory of political liberalism in the middle of the nineteenth century.<sup>13</sup> In modern times the Protestant areas of the country have always been more

<sup>13</sup> See Mayer, "Cultural Pluralism . . ." (cited above, note 10) pp. 175-78.



populous than the Catholic parts, all census enumerations showing the Protestants outnumbering the Catholics. But the reverse is true of the immigrants. This is evident from Table 4, where the census data on the religious affiliations of Swiss citizens and of resident aliens, available since 1900, are shown separately.

As the top panel of Table 4 indicates, the proportion of Protestants among the Swiss citizens has been declining slowly but

TABLE 4. Percentage Distribution of the Swiss Population by Religion, 1900-50<sup>a</sup>

Year	Protestants	Catholics	Jews	Others	Total	
					%	1000S
SWISS CITIZENS						
1900	61.6%	38.0%	0.2%	0.2%	100%	2,932
1910	61.4	37.8	0.2	0.6	100	3,201
1920	60.8	38.0	0.3	0.9	100	3,478
1930	60.0	38.6	0.3	1.1	100	3,711
1941	59.3	39.7	0.3	0.7	100	4,042
1950	58.5	40.3	0.2	1.0	100	4,430
ALIEN RESIDENTS						
1900	28.5%	68.9%	1.9%	0.7%	100%	383
1910	25.8	69.5	2.2	2.5	100	552
1920	28.4	65.6	2.9	3.1	100	402
1930	29.1	65.6	2.3	3.0	100	356
1941	27.2	66.4	4.1	2.3	100	224
1950	22.4	71.5	2.9	3.2	100	285
TOTAL POPULATION						
1900	57.8%	41.6%	0.4%	0.2%	100%	3,315
1910	56.2	42.4	0.5	0.9	100	3,753
1920	57.5	40.9	0.5	1.1	100	3,880
1930	57.3	41.0	0.4	1.3	100	4,066
1941	57.6	41.1	0.5	0.8	100	4,266
1950	56.3	41.7	0.4	1.1	100	4,715

<sup>a</sup> From *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz, 1955*.

steadily throughout the past fifty years, while the proportion of Catholics has been increasing. This is partly the result of the naturalization of Catholic aliens, of whom an estimated 130,000 to 140,000 were granted Swiss citizenship between 1900 and 1950, but it is mostly the result of fertility differentials. As is evident from the following figures on marital fertility by religious affiliation (the number of live births per 1,000 married women 15 to 44 years old),<sup>14</sup> the fertility difference between Catholics and Protestants, which was slight in 1900, widened sharply during the

	1900	1930	1940-43
Catholic	277	185	171
Protestant	258	129	128
Jewish	...	74	72

ensuing three decades as the Protestants, who are more urbanized, turned to birth control practices more rapidly than did the less urbanized Catholics. Since 1930 the gap has somewhat narrowed again, but as long as a significant difference persists the Catholic creed can be expected to make further gains.

Immigration reinforces this trend. As can be seen from the middle panel of Table 4, the Catholics have always had approximately a two-thirds majority among the alien residents, and during the most recent intercensal period their share reached a new high of 71.5 percent, while the proportion of Protestants fell to an all-time low of 22.4 percent. The influx of foreigners, therefore, will continue to weaken the position of the Protestants and strengthen that of the Catholics. To date the balance of the two major religious groups in the total population has not been greatly affected, as is evident from the bottom panel of Table 4. But if the trend of the underlying demographic forces of differential fertility and immigration continues unchanged, significant shifts

<sup>14</sup> Data from Carl Brüscheiler, "Konfession und Geburtenrückgang," in *Kirche und Leben*, vol. 6 (1938) pp. 53-54, and Anton Meli, "Geburten," in *Handbuch der schweizerischen Volkswirtschaft* (cited above, note 4) vol. 1, p. 276. Data for 1900 are estimated.

in the religious equilibrium must be expected to take place in the future.<sup>15</sup>

Those who do not adhere to either of the two major Christian creeds have always constituted an insignificant proportion of the Swiss population. Jews, who were not granted full freedom of movement and equal citizenship rights until 1866, increased in number from 3,000 in 1850 to a maximum of 21,000 in 1920, largely through immigration. Jewish immigrants, especially those from Eastern Europe, have been received with very mixed feelings by the Swiss Gentiles, and after immigration controls were instituted in 1915, the Swiss authorities endeavored to hold down their numbers as much as possible. They have also been most reluctant to grant them naturalization papers. Although there has been very little immigration of foreign Jews since the first World War, 44 percent of the Jewish residents were still aliens in 1950, as is evident from the accompanying tabulation. The Jewish communities have ceased to grow since 1920, and face eventual extinction. Not only has immigration been practically cut off, but the low Jewish fertility rate (shown in the preceding tabulation) is insufficient for the reproduction of their number. The balance of Jewish births and deaths has been negative for a long time; the most recent figures available show 2,270 Jewish

<sup>15</sup> It is probable, of course, that the international migrations of Swiss citizens also contribute to the shifts in linguistic and religious composition. Unfortunately the lack of adequate direct migration statistics makes it impossible to determine precisely to what extent the various cultural groups participate in the emigration and repatriation of Swiss nationals. Some very rough calculations by Bernhard Waldburger, in "Die Entwicklung der Konfessionsverhältnisse in der Schweiz, insbesondere seit 1850" (unpublished dissertation, University of Zurich, 1949), indicate a disproportionately high share of Protestants in this movement. The migration balance of Swiss citizens was negative during the first three decades of the twentieth century, resulting in a net migration loss of 137,040 nationals from 1900 to 1930. This probably contributed to some extent to the concurrent decline of Protestants among the Swiss citizens. Thereafter the flow of citizens reversed itself; from 1930 to 1950, 72,540 more citizens returned home than went abroad. These, however, are included in the census counts, and therefore the decline in the proportion of Protestant citizens from 60 percent in 1930 to 58.5 percent in 1950 cannot be attributed to migration. On the contrary, it is likely that without the fairly massive repatriation of Swiss citizens from abroad the Protestant drop in these years would have been even greater.

## DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS

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Year	Total Number of Jews	Alien Jews in % of Total Jews	% of Jewish Individuals Living in Religiously Mixed Marriages	
			Men	Women
1900	12,264	59.5%	4.1%	3.1%
1910	18,462	66.0	4.9	4.3
1920	20,979	55.1	6.9	5.4
1930	17,973	45.5	9.2	7.7
1941	19,429	47.1	12.5	6.9
1950	19,048	43.6	19.2	10.0

Source: *Eidgenössische Volkszählungen*.

births during the years 1942-51, heavily outnumbered by 3,260 Jewish deaths.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, the intermarriage rate has been rising rapidly, and has now reached a high proportion: of 4,674 Jewish individuals marrying during 1940-55, almost one-third, 1,518, selected a non-Jewish partner. In these circumstances the gradual disappearance of the Jewish group in Switzerland seems likely.

Of the 53,000 persons who were listed by the 1950 census as being other than Protestants, Catholics, or Jews, some 80 to 90 percent are individuals who declare themselves without any religious affiliation.<sup>17</sup> Their proportion in the population increased rapidly during the first two decades of this century, when atheist propaganda was fashionable and seems to have had some effect. Since 1920, however, their proportion has fluctuated irregularly around 1 percent of the total population (see Table 4)—a surprisingly low percentage in an age of secularization.

## IV

It seems desirable to conclude this analysis of the postwar influx of aliens, and its demographic and social effects on the Swiss popu-

<sup>16</sup> See Hans Guth, "Die Juden in der Schweiz im Spiegel der Bevölkerungsstatistik," in *Schweizerischer Israelitischer Gemeindebund, Festschrift zum 50 Jährigen Bestehen* (Zurich 1954) p. 102.

<sup>17</sup> Anton Meli, "Konfession," in *Handbuch der schweizerischen Volkswirtschaft* (cited above, note 4) vol. 1, p. 263.

lation, with a reappraisal of the character of the movement. Inasmuch as it consists entirely of self-financed individuals, attracted to Switzerland primarily by economic opportunities, this flow of immigration strongly resembles the traditional type of free individual migration of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is definitely not an instance of planned or induced migration of the modern type.

Yet it differs from the earlier model in one important respect: it lacks the *laissez-faire laissez-passer* characteristic of the earlier immigration. The postwar flow of immigrants is controlled by the authorities of the immigration country on the basis of manpower shortages and labor-market fluctuations. This occupational selection is effective because it is accompanied by further supervision exercised by the police. The overwhelming majority of the immigrants are admitted into the country only for limited periods of time, and have permission to engage only in specified occupations; if they accept non-authorized kinds of employment their permits may be revoked and they may have to leave the country. Furthermore, aliens become eligible for naturalization only after they have been granted the right of permanent establishment, which releases them from police supervision, and since this privilege is granted reluctantly and sparingly, most of the recent influx of immigrants remain temporary and "revocable," at least in theory.

In practice, however, the influx appears a good deal more permanent than in legal theory. As has been demonstrated, the very occupational selection exercised by the authorities results in the admission of a group of aliens with special demographic and occupational characteristics. The predominance of single, young females leads to a rising intermarriage rate; in the ten years 1946-55 no less than 41,000 alien women acquired permanent Swiss citizenship through marriage. Another 39,000 aliens of both sexes were released from police control and admitted to permanent residence during this same period. This number will increase rapidly in the future, since recent agreements with Italy,

Austria, and Germany provide that nationals of these countries who have resided in Switzerland for ten years on a "temporary" basis will automatically be granted permanent residence.<sup>18</sup> It should also be noted that Switzerland has recently granted asylum to 11,000 Hungarian refugees; their status remains uncertain, but many of them may eventually become permanent residents.

Moreover, since most of the alien workers fill the least desirable jobs left vacant by Swiss citizens, a goodly proportion of the foreign labor force may not become surplus and expendable even in less favorable economic circumstances. Swiss citizens who have graduated to better paid and more prestigious occupations are not likely to return to domestic and other menial jobs, even in a depression period. This is not to say, of course, that a severe and prolonged depression would not put a stop to further immigration and would not reduce even the number of aliens at present residing in Switzerland. But as long as economic conditions continue favorable, the "temporary" admission of numerous immigrants will undoubtedly continue. The longer the movement lasts, the larger the number of aliens who in one way or another will become a permanent part of the Swiss population.

<sup>18</sup> See A. Koller, "Umschichtungen in der schweizerischen Bevölkerung," in *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik*, vol. 92 (September 1956) p. 280.

# CONFORMITY\*

BY PAUL TILLICH

CONFORMITY is a word that does not necessarily have negative connotations. We all must conform to some given forms of life and thought. Education—even if it has a better ideal than adjustment—aims at giving us a form. And in doing so, it makes us conform to the sources and bearers of such form. There are cultures, highly advanced as well as primitive ones, that in this way produce conformity for long periods of history. It was in Great Britain that my unqualified rejection of conformity was shaken, for there I found a powerful conformity that does not destroy the creative potentialities in the individual. This is so, I realized, because Great Britain lives consciously out of the past. Her conformism has an historical dimension.

Conformity is a negative force if the individual form that gives uniqueness and dignity to a person is subdued by the collective form. If this happens—often in connection with the loss of the historical dimension—a structure appears for which it probably would be more adequate to use the word “patternization”—the process in which persons are modeled according to a definite pattern. Patternization is what determines our period, both in learning and in life. And the questions I want to ask now are: What are the patternizing powers in our present culture, and are we able to resist them? Are we still able to say “no” in matters of serious concern, in spite of the tremendous strength of the patternizing forces?

In recent years several scientific books have appeared which describe the contemporary processes of patternization and add criticism and warning. Such warning was anticipated in fiction,

\* EDITORS' NOTE—This paper is the address delivered by Dr. Tillich at the annual Commencement exercises at the New School for Social Research, June 11, 1957.



in Huxley's *Brave New World* and, in a more sinister way, in Orwell's 1984. In both novels a kind of negative utopia is presented—a total reversal of the positive utopias that opened the modern period of Western history. The conquest of nature by reason, which in the utopias of the Renaissance was considered the main liberating power, is now seen as a means for the enslavement of man by patterns of life and thought that deprive him of the possibility of freedom and individual self-affirmation. According to the negative utopias of the last decades, an age of total patternization is about to come upon us.

The series of scientific books to which I referred confirms this diagnosis. Sociological analyses as given in *The Lonely Crowd*, *The Organization Man*, *The Hidden Persuaders*, *Mass Culture*, and others—besides several significant magazine articles—show what one of these books, written in German, expresses in its title: *The Future Has Already Begun*. The material presented in all these writings is rather impressive. One can distinguish three main causes of the present process of patternization: our technical civilization as such; the intentional imposition of patterns on the masses by interested groups; and the striving for security in many people, especially in the youngest generation.

That technical civilization as such, in its objective structures, is conducive to patternization is in complete contrast to its origins. It was born out of the courage of people who asked the questions that soon undercut the security of mediaeval conformity. How then could it happen that the answers to these questions became the principles under which present-day patternizing conformism developed? It happened because in the new structure of society the subject who asked the critical questions, that is, man as man, was more and more pushed aside and almost removed. The human self that once had the courage to say "no" to a thousand years of sacred conformity could not find a place in the world created by it. Man was interpreted theoretically as a bundle of conditioned reflexes without a determining center; and in practice he was treated as a commodity, a cog in the big machine of

production and consumption, an object among objects, to be tested, calculated, and managed. This refers to everyone within industrial mass society, even to the central wheels of the machine. Even those who determine are determined by the structure of the society they control. Therefore, as the communist revolutions have shown, the replacement of one ruling group by another does not change the patternizing structures of industrial mass society.

This is the objective situation. Like every human situation, it becomes reality through human action and reaction, and most conspicuous among those whose actions make for patternized conformity are the political manipulators of mass reactions. The manipulation of men is not, of course, a one-way road. It is successful only if the reaction of the manipulated is not negative. Even the totalitarian systems are established by revolutionary armies, not seriously resisted by the masses, and after their establishment their controlling groups cannot afford to neglect the reaction of the people in the long run; from time to time they observe signs of a silent resistance and change their methods of control. But political patternization, whether it has a more one-way or a more two-way character, works to eliminate the possibility of a nonconformist "no." Concentration camps and labor camps are not so much tools for the extermination of actual enemies as threatening symbols of the transformation of human beings into manageable objects.

In the democratic section of the world, political manipulation is much more a two-way road, but there too it drives millions toward a model-conformity. The schizophrenic split of mankind into East and West, and the secrecy connected with it, makes an independent political judgment almost impossible for most people. It prevents the rise of fresh political philosophies, since every nonconformist political thought is denounced as neutralist or worse. Courage is demanded for the expression of serious political disagreement even by a student, because it may later wreck his career. But if students and the generation they represent are silenced, where can we turn to hear the voice of nonconformity?

Certainly not to the controlling powers in economy, to advertising, or to mass culture—those three powerful tools of patternization.

As to the first of these, I do not need to dwell on the screening and testing that precede an appointment to even the lowest executive position in big business and civil administration. It is well known that they delve into hidden trends of the unconscious, into all phases of private life, into marriage and the relation of the wife to the enterprise and her willingness to subject herself to its social requests. Sociologists believe that the image of the executive will become the pattern, vigorously imposed on all groups of society. And they even derive from this pattern the peculiar character of the present movement toward religion. They may be right!

The political as well as the economic manipulation of our society is supported and often controlled by the managers of advertising. This also is a two-way road. The advertiser can create needs only if he knows the hidden desires of the people. Out of this necessity the "depth approach" in advertising has developed. When I first read about this method I remembered that once I had given a sermon about the meaning of depth—and I shuddered. And I believe that Freud too would shudder at the use of his discoveries in advertising depth research. Certainly, there are hidden motives that determine the buying of a special brand of shaving cream or car, the attention to a special advertisement. But when the managers of advertising and their allies and customers in business and politics use this knowledge to direct our lives and thoughts, they actualize just those elements in us that do *not* constitute our real self but come from our childhood memories, our resentments, our daydreams, our contingent desires. All this does belong to us, but it is not we ourselves, in our deciding, responsible center—the point of our freedom and personal dignity. This center must be avoided by the manipulators, because out of it may arise the "no" that could destroy their attempts to condition our reactions. We would cease to be a calculable object, and this would be disastrous for all methods of manipulation. We would again become individual persons, and cease to be examples of one of the several

types of reaction defined by the depth-approach of motivation research.

The problem of mass culture and its patternizing effect is an inexhaustible subject in itself. It too is ambiguous, not simply good and not simply bad. But in any case, it is one of the driving forces toward model-conformity. It is a matter of mass distribution, and for this very reason it cannot avoid the stereotype, standardization, and the lowest common denominator. Cultural creations of past and present become manipulated consumer goods. One can hardly avoid the impression that the means of mass communication through which these cultural commodities are distributed to everybody have the effect that children receive much too early the status of adults while adults remain children, never allowed to grow into maturity. Maturity, personal as well as cultural, presupposes a suffering under problems, a necessity to decide, a possibility of saying "no." Unfortunately, one gets the further impression that the methods used in some places for producing a religious revival are essentially of the same type as those we find in the marketing of mass culture. This is tragic, because religion is supposed to be the place where the ultimate source and power of nonconformism become manifest, the place where the prophetic "no" to all patterns, religious as well as non-religious, is heard and pronounced.

These are the conditioning forces in the process of patternization. But they would not be so powerful as they are if it were not for the third factor I mentioned: a state of mind, especially in the youngest generation, that is ready to subject itself to these forces. One can observe in many young people an intense desire for security, internal and external, a will to be accepted by the group at any price, an unwillingness to show individual traits, a conscious rejection of nonconformist attitudes in the older generation, an acceptance of a well circumscribed happiness without serious risks. It is difficult for my generation to understand this attitude. Therefore we should restrain ourselves from harsh judgment. But

nobody can doubt that it confirms the assertion that "the future has already begun."

This is the picture. How do we react to it? A few weeks ago I gave a speech to a large group of architects and referred to the patternizing effect of many suburban housing projects, not only through the monotony of the buildings but also through the abolition of privacy and with it of the possibility of the self to encounter itself in solitude. I was then asked whether this does not agree with human nature, which makes collectivism unavoidable. My answer is no, and must be, as is shown even by the possibility of asking such a question. The totally patternized man would have lost the capability of asking questions and deliberating about answers. He would cease to be a man.

Today as always there are symptoms of resistance to patternization, symptoms that reveal something about human nature. The first is what the French call *ennui*, being bored with existence itself. This is an important potentiality of man. It saves our children from being drowned by comics and television. It forces the managers of mass culture to change the fashion of music and dance and all their other products from time to time. And to do this, they have to follow the guidance of a less conformist minority.

Another symptom of resistance to the patternizing processes is the awareness of these processes in science and art. We have become conscious of the threat of dehumanization. The literature to which I referred has abundantly exposed the dangerous forces. And as an old religious symbol teaches us, an exposed demon has lost much of its power. This is why the manipulators of conformity try, often unconsciously, to make the books of exposé just another in the line of goods for mass consumption.

A third symptom of the presence of nonconformist forces in human nature is the spirit of rebellion, which still exists in many places in the Western world, even in the lonely-crowd attitude of the younger generation. It is a spirit which in its best manifestation is the courage to say "yes" to one's birthright as a unique, free, and responsible individual, and consequently to say "no" to what-

ever would destroy the freedom and dignity of man—even at the price of taking socially unpleasant and dangerous consequences upon oneself. Such courage is able to do what is even more difficult than resisting external pressures: it is able to resist internal compulsions, such as a socially conditioned, uneasy, and anxious conscience. It is not in willfulness but in the courage to take a moral risk that one has the right to say “no” even to the commands of an anxious conscience.

The courage that resists patternized conformity is ultimately rooted in a dimension of human experience that transcends fashions and patterns, anxieties and compulsions, generations and nations. It is the dimension that appears if somebody asks with radical seriousness the question of the ultimate meaning of his life. Whether or not one call this the religious question, it is one that is rooted in the true, unfathomable depth of every human being. Out of this depth arises the courage to resist patternization. In religious language one would call it the prophetic spirit. But this spirit is not restricted to historical religion, which often has betrayed it. It can and must appear in our daily life, in our professional work, in our social behavior, in our political conviction, in our cultural preferences, in our human relations, in our creative eros.

The future of our country would look brighter if at each commencement in every college and in every university at least a few students entered their vocational life with the decision to resist the seemingly irresistible powers of patternizing conformity. It is my wish and my hope that many in this outgoing class will remain determined to preserve their human integrity and their power to say “no,” even under severe pressures by the patterns of life and thought prescribed by society. We hope for nonconformists among you, for your sake, for the sake of our nation, for the sake of humanity.

## "SCARCE MONEY": COMMENT AND REJOINDER

### COMMENT

HANS NEISSER's article, "Scarce Money," in the Spring 1957 issue of *Social Research*, impresses me as an excellent analysis of a current political-economic issue. But I feel impelled to question his observations on the rate of interest. Professor Neisser points out that, within the framework of a tight-money policy, means were available to prevent the rise of rates in the mortgage field, but he believes that "no similarly effective techniques exist for avoiding higher interest rates in the other fields. . . Here the shift in income arising from the increase in rates was inevitable" (p. 45). While any policy of monetary restraint will undoubtedly tend to raise interest rates, a good case can be made that a differently directed scarce-money policy would have made for a more restricted and slower rise in rates.

There has been a significant asymmetry in recent monetary policy.<sup>1</sup> When the authorities were attempting to stem a decline in economic activity in mid-1954, monetary ease was promoted by a reduction in reserve requirements. Since mid-1955, however, when the emphasis shifted to restraint of inflation, no move has been made to restore reserve requirements to their former level, nor have reserves been decreased through open-market sales. Instead, monetary restraint has been achieved by raising the rediscount rate seven times.

The boosts in the rediscount rate constituted direct and powerful encouragement to the banks to raise their interest rates. If, instead, tight money had been pursued by raising reserve requirements, the banks would probably have restricted credit by a greater resort to selective lending policies; without the encouragement of a higher rediscount rate it is likely that the banks would not have raised their interest charges so much. No doubt, the excess demand for loan funds would have encouraged commercial-bank borrowing from the Federal Reserve banks; indirectly, then, this would have forced the authorities to raise rediscount rates. But the reluctance of the banks to increase their indebtedness to the System would most likely have restrained such borrowing. If so, the monetary authorities would not

<sup>1</sup> Senator Douglas has called attention to this in his supplemental views on the President's Economic Report: United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Report of the Joint Economic Committee on the January 1957 Economic Report of the President* (Washington 1957) p. 19.



have been compelled to increase rediscount rates so much as they have under the policy actually adopted, and this in turn would have encouraged lower commercial-bank rates. Moreover, if the banks had been more dependent on Federal Reserve loans, moral suasion could have had some effect in promoting credit rationing instead of higher interest charges.

Even if, other things being equal, the interest rates called forth by raising reserve requirements would eventually tend to catch up with those resulting from boosting rediscount rates, it seems quite reasonable to believe that there would be a lag. Such a lag would have a dual significance. Since inflationary pressure might recede at any time, thereby necessitating the termination of a scarce-money policy, the interest rates might never get a chance to attain the level generated by the policy actually employed. Furthermore, so long as the lag persisted, total interest payments per period would be lower than the present policy requires, and thus the shift in income would be smaller.

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### REJOINDER

DR. SCHATZ points to another tool of "rationing" funds: the change of the reserve requirements for member banks. By raising the requirements, the desired credit limitation could, he thinks, have been achieved without an increase in the interest rates: "if the banks had been more dependent on Federal Reserve loans, moral suasion could have had some effect in promoting credit rationing." But the member banks could have satisfied higher reserve requirements without rationing their customers in industry and commerce. I doubt that moral suasion would have been strong enough to make them maintain their portfolio of government securities, especially of bills, certificates, and notes: they could have financed increased reserve requirements not by lending less to business but by forcing government paper back into the Federal Reserve banks. From this point of view it is indeed a misfortune (as Professor S. Weintraub pointed out in the *New Republic* of June 3, 1957) that Marriner Eccles' proposal a dozen years ago was not accepted, according to which member banks would have been obligated to hold as secondary reserve against deposits a certain

amount of government securities, of course at an interest rate fixed once and for all.

None of these schemes would ever cover the whole capital market: under the pressure of rising demand the rates in some parts of the market would rise, and the government in particular would have to pay higher rates for currently renewed borrowings. But the relief to a large portion of the debtors, including the federal government, would be substantial; and since this type of "rationing"—that is, regulating cash-down payments and imposing a "secondary reserve" on banks—cannot create a black market, does not weaken the incentives necessary in a private-enterprise system, and conforms with our feelings for social justice, the economist can with a good conscience sponsor it.

But while scholars thus discuss and criticize or justify the policy of scarce money, economic life itself changes. At the time these lines are written (mid-August 1957) it does not seem impossible that the short era of scarce money is drawing to an end. There has been a partial change in government policy: a reduction of the cash payment, in connection with FHA-insured mortgages, to a few percent of the purchase price for the house. The concurrent increase of the interest rate itself to  $5\frac{1}{4}$  percent will not matter much, since it is coupled with stricter limitations on the discount permitted on the principal of the mortgage; and in any case, as I pointed out in my paper, the deterrent effects of small interest-rate changes are unimportant compared with the powerful effects of the cash-down regulation. The policy measure under discussion may have been intended only to shift funds (and indirectly resources) to residential building, away from other construction. Actually its effect is likely to be a credit inflation, since the measures to restrict bank credit undertaken at the same time (increase in the Federal Reserve rediscount rates, sales of government securities in the open market) are not certain to be effective: these measures cannot prevent the banks from augmenting their reserves and their credit potential by allowing their still substantial portfolio of short-term government securities to dwindle.

But while the net effect of the present policy is rather to increase a part of the demand for funds without effectively limiting the supply of bank credit, there are important changes in the remaining part of demand. In general, investment activity seems to have reached a peak. Neither investment in industrial plant and equipment nor investment in inventories is any longer increasing (inventories are slowly declining); and of the investment in plant and equipment it

must be feared that it will be unable to maintain its extraordinary high level, in view of the fact that consumption has ceased growing and the backlogs of orders are shrinking. One must not be deceived by the rise in interest rates on bank loans to business: the demand for such loans, primarily for working-capital purposes, will rise for some time after the peak of investment in plant and equipment has been passed.

It was primarily the increase in industrial investment of all kinds which made money scarce (together with the savers' rising aversion, in times of steadily rising costs of living, to investing in fixed-interest securities). The shrinkage of investment will have the opposite effect. Indeed, from this point of view we could put in a good word for a policy which, in anticipation of a decline in industrial investment (including business construction), tries to stimulate residential building. Unfortunately, however, no more than a minor recession in industrial investment can be compensated in this way. Though money is not likely to become so plentiful that long-term government securities will bear no more than  $2\frac{1}{2}$  percent, it is bound to be less scarce. Then Congress, instead of investigating the reasons for rising interest rates, will turn to investigating the causes of increasing underutilization. The public may become aware that in an economy in which the propensity to save and, in good times, the volume of saving by individuals and business are as great as in the United States, "appropriately" scarce money is a sign of economic health. "Appropriately" means that the money supply must remain sufficiently elastic to finance the wage bill at the optimum level of employment technically feasible.

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## LETTER TO THE EDITOR

DEAR SIR: Some of my friends in the academic world have called my attention to the essay "National Bolshevism in Weimar Germany—Alliance of Political Extremes Against Democracy," by Abraham Ascher and Guenter Lewy, published in the Winter 1956 issue of *Social Research*. Since I have written on the same subject, and was in fact directly concerned with the so-called "National Bolshevik" movement in Germany twenty-five years ago (to which fact the essay makes several references), I was naturally interested in the topic and eager to read any presentation which does justice to the facts and events.

I should not burden you with this letter if my criticism of the essay were only that it omitted data essential for a correct understanding of this movement; that it did not mention certain very important events; or that its authors were apparently unaware of the existence of many accessible and essential documents that ought to have been cited.

The reason for this letter is of a personal nature. On page 476 the essay contains the following statement: "Paetel's intellectual development, it has been said with some justification, had reached 'an advanced stage of Bolshevization,' and 'nationalism was merely used by him to attain Bolshevism.'" A footnote to this statement refers to Adolf Ehrt's book *Totale Krise—Totale Revolution? Die "Schwarze Front" des völkischen Nationalismus* (Berlin 1933), published by the notorious Antikomintern Verlag (called Eckart Verlag), financed by Dr. Goebbels. You will understand why I am perturbed when two liberal American historians use a Nazi source "with some justification" in order to say of one who was robbed of his citizenship, participated in the German resistance movement, and was hunted by the Gestapo in quite a few countries, that he used his "nationalistic" (patriotic) opposition to the National Socialist Party of the early thirties as a cover for "Bolshevization"—thereby practically calling me a communist agent.

This implication I most emphatically reject. In the years from 1930 to 1932 I advocated cooperation among *all* anti-Nazi forces, especially between the National Revolutionaries (the so-called "National Bolsheviks") and the German Communist Party. But I also made it crystal clear in public utterances that I was far removed from the *Weltanschauung* and the final objectives of Marxism and the Communist Party. Messrs. Ascher and Lewy could have found proof of this had they been meticulous enough simply in referring to my writings, accessible even in American libraries. In my booklet, "Das National-

bolschewistische Manifest" (for which the Library of Congress has an entry in its card file), published on the day of the historic "Torchlight Procession" (30 January 1933) and immediately confiscated, there is a chapter entitled "Why not the Communist Party?" from which I should like to quote one sentence: "Even after the few comparisons made here, and without going into the fine points of the matter thoroughly, it becomes clear that *nationalist* and *Marxist* objectives are *completely different*, although it is also true that the political exigencies of the day dictate certain common demands and certain common insights to both camps."

If, despite my explicit rejection of the communist ideology, I worked together with communists, as I did with conservatives and liberals, against the National Socialist danger, that does not make me an agent of Bolshevization, any more than Churchill's and Roosevelt's cooperation with the USSR against the Third Reich makes communists of them. That the Nazis called me a communist did not bother me. They didn't like it that I had a certain influence within their own youth groups. But I don't like it that American historians repeat the Nazi lies.

To make it clear: as a speaker for a "Gruppe Sozialrevolutionärer Nationalisten" I was not only concerned with certain far-reaching socialist ideas (called "National Bolshevik"); I also urged at that time all true German patriots to ally themselves with workers' groups, notwithstanding ideologies, against the Hitler movement. And I think I was one of the few at that moment in German history to realize and cry out that Hitler could be beaten in that eleventh hour only if *all* the national forces, including socialists, communists, and anti-Nazi conservatives, fought together. In the periodical *Die Sozialistische Nation*, which I published from 1931 to 1933 (then confiscated) and which is apparently also unknown to Messrs. Ascher and Lewy, though it is available in the New York Public Library, there are dozens of examples that are conclusive proof that, though our group was ready to march with the Marxists "for Germany against Hitler," we were organizationally and ideologically unmistakably far removed from world communism.

So much in the interest of truth. I am tempted to add a great deal more on the aforementioned essay, but decline to do so in the belief that it is not really any longer necessary.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

HOFFMANN, STANLEY, with the collaboration of Michel des Accords, Serge Hurtig, Jean du Rostu, Jean-Michel Royer, and with preface by Jean Meynaud. *Le mouvement Poujade*. Paris: Armand Colin. 1956. xxviii & 418 pp.

There are many signs that Poujadism is on the downgrade. Its attraction seems to have been diminished by its recent stunning electoral defeat in Paris, its never-ending internal dissensions, the defection of important members of the cast who have turned to the greener pastures of traditional rightist parties, and more recently by the crisis of fulfillment, the acceptance of one of its main sales points, a North Africa hold-the-line policy, by the incumbent government and large parts of centrist and rightist public opinion. The preordained savior becomes again just one more voice in the cacophony of discordant counsellors. But even if Poujadism should prove to have been only a transitory fad, it has put the spotlight on the emotional and economic stress that the French independent middle class is experiencing in the Fourth Republic's process of economic modernization and adaptation.

For this reason the well documented, detailed, and imaginative study presented by Stanley Hoffmann and his group of collaborators at France's National Foundation of Political Science should be highly welcome. The work is divided into three parts. The first deals with the origin of Poujadism as a small-town protest move of shopkeepers and artisans against the iniquities of the French tax system. The second and most exhaustive part deals with the expansion of the movement under the leadership of its originator and animator.

Here the book follows Poujade's reverses and successes in the face of a hesitant government policy, the rate and process of his movement's national diffusion, and its patterns of organization. Hoffmann makes a stab at the mystery of its financing, and turns the spotlight on the stages of its transformation from a professional and avowedly apolitical protest move to a political organization proper. Building and enlarging on more detailed studies, Hoffmann disproves the facile assumption that Poujadism may simply be considered the heir of the Gaullist landslide of 1951. Its geographical strong points do not jibe with those of De Gaulle, for its success has been most marked in regions of traditionalist rather than of industrial occupational strati-

fication, and in departments with a stagnating or receding rather than with an increasing population. In the beginning the movement profited from Communist miscalculations as to its potentialities as on antechamber and recruiting ground for future Communist penetration, and from the somewhat more prolonged discomfiture of rival professional organizations that objected more to its assumed airs of toughness than to its goals proper. But after Poujade had quelled resistance in his own ranks against a full-fledged entry into the political arena, he banked on the attraction of his negative formulas: "sortez les sortants," a kind of "we've had enough" slogan, and an assertion of the need for convoking new estates general. Both slogans were calculated to profit from general discontent and to appeal vaguely to French national tradition, a course that might keep the movement within the frame of legality while at the same time evoking the symbolism of a new if completely indeterminate departure. But they were sloganized symbols rather than a program.

In insisting on this difference Hoffmann enters the realm of an interesting, if somewhat problematical, interpretation. According to his analysis in the third part of the book, the emptiness of the movement's program, which became patently and painfully clear after the group entered the Palais Bourbon, is closely linked to its social origins among the small-town and rural middle classes. These origins are said to set it off from the traditional rightist movements and leagues, with their worship of a strong state and strong executive, and to tie it to the social milieu of the French provinces from which arose the politically progressive but socially conservative defenders of the Third Republic, with their eternal watchfulness and mistrust of encroachment by the state. The emptiness of the movement's appeal as a contribution to the solution of far-reaching national problems may thus appear in the somewhat more friendly light of a spurious attempt to adapt the doctrines of Alain to the frontal attacks of the modern state against traditional modes of living. Hence the "apolitical" character of direct action, as practiced by Poujadism, and the fact that its chosen method has been never-ending boycotts and harassing tactics; hence also the fact that the rejection of any change and the indiscriminate condemnation of all governmental elites have been elevated to the rank of political principle.

But it seems to me—and the documentation and part of the analysis of the book itself offer evidence enough for this interpretation—that in the process of transformation undergone by the politics of the French countryside there has somehow disappeared the traditional



rationalist nineteenth-century belief system, so often evoked before the war by the shopkeepers' political and intellectual representatives at the Palais Bourbon and at the Rue d'Ulm. Poujade's espousal of colonialism, his xenophobia and leanings toward antisemitism, his anti-intellectual and anti-parliamentary attitude, as well as his methods of leadership and propaganda, belong to a recent vintage. It may well be, as Hoffmann postulates, that the sons of the self-same political clientele that acclaimed the social status quo fifty years ago, under the banners of the Third Republic, feel spiritually at home in a movement that starts from their immediate life experience in a battle against what seems to them the monster of the modern state. But the steadfast mutual enmity between Poujadism and all legitimate labor organizations, as well as the continuing affinity between Poujadists and all rightist groups and publications, so well documented in Hoffmann's study, bears ample evidence that Poujade's projected road is not intended to lead back to the utopia of the self-relying economic man, and that, on the contrary, in spite of its somewhat different beginnings and type of appeal, it merges into the common road of nationalist reaction. This slight difference in interpretative conjectures should not, however, diminish the tribute due to an unusually sensible and sensitive exposition of a phenomenon that is both interesting and disturbing.

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KNIGHT, FRANK H. *On the History and Method of Economics: Selected Essays*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1956. vii & 309 pp. \$6.

This book is a compilation of essays published in the years 1928 to 1951 in various journals, and addressed, as the title suggests, to the problems of economic analysis. Many of these essays are already widely known and discussed landmarks in the history of economic thought.

Professor Knight is a truly eloquent exponent of his central beliefs, which are: first, liberty is the supreme value in human and social affairs; second, it is both immoral and empirically false to regard human behavior as something that can be predicted and controlled in the same way as other natural phenomena; third, the proper concern of economics (and of social science in general) is with the search for principles of social policy, and social policy should be designed

to facilitate the exercise of human freedom, the resolution of possible conflicts, and the expression as well as the implementation of a social consensus.

Eloquent as Knight is in propounding what he holds to be true, he further reveals himself, in discussing certain views that he regards as opposed to his own, to be a richly talented philippicist. He displays in large measure the traits that are required for excellence in this respect: he is long on erudition and short on temper. His especial ire is directed at authoritarianism, in any area and in any form; "scientism" and logical positivism, representing, in his eyes, the morally degraded and scientifically invalid view of human and social phenomena as objects of study in the natural-science sense; and the general obtuseness, absurdity, subversiveness, or maliciousness of the many current social thinkers that hold non-Knightean views (see especially "What is Truth' in Economics?," "Salvation by Science: The Gospel According to Professor Lundberg," and "The Role of Principles in Economics and Politics"). His devastating wit and sparkling verbal swordsmanship are a joy to behold, assuming only that one is not in the line of attack, or does not identify with those who are.

Many readers may well find themselves wanting to adhere to Professor Knight's position, but unable to do so. The position is attractive—founded, as it is, on values we all cherish and on a view of man that is flattering to the ego. But it soon becomes clear (at least to the present reviewer) that in his advocacies Knight tends to stress the "ought" to the point of denying the "is"; and in his condemnations he tends to throw out the proverbial baby with the bathwater. Knight, as he so often points out himself, is human, and therefore is afflicted with the usual human inability to simultaneously develop strong feelings and balanced judgments on the same issue.

Two cases in point, one of advocacy and one of condemnation, will suffice. Knight, as has been mentioned, feels strongly that a predictive science of human conduct is impossible, and that the attempt to control human conduct is evil. Social science, therefore, should take human strivings as given, should try to "understand" them, and should try to develop "rules of the game" that will promote their realization. But prediction and control of human behavior by other humans is inevitable. We could not live in a social context without "predicting" the actions and responses of our neighbors and without "manipulating" (causing to act) other people, as in the very common and necessary act of persuasion. Even Knight himself, in promot-

ing certain "rules of the game," is involved in a prediction of how people will behave under these rules, and in an attempt to control the course of human events by the enactment of the rules.

Secondly, in his condemnation of "scientism" as naive and immoral, he seems to ignore the fact that a somewhat simplistic view of human behavior can be and often has been a powerful heuristic device. The history of economic analysis itself is the best known example of this point; and, in general, the progression from "weaker" to "stronger" models is probably the most productive line of approach to any complicated reality. In the case of human conduct, the progression seems to lead to a game-theoretic type of model, in which the "lawful" and the "human" phenomena are both allowed for. Knight's moral argument is clearly valid, however, if policy conclusions are drawn too early.

There are strong grounds for a suspicion that the entire argument of "scientism" versus "Knightism" is an unnecessary one, and is based on an extreme view of what is meant by "prediction" and "control." The behavior of *all* open systems, physical or human, is partly predictable and controllable, and partly not. The difference between "physical" and "human" in this respect may well be one of degree, rather than of kind. And in either case, the same methods of analysis are productive.

A final point. Knight, in many places, stresses his opinion that the concept of man as an object of "science" is not only immoral and empirically invalid, but logically self-contradictory. He claims that the very thought of a man coming to predict his own behavior is absurd; if problem-solving behavior is predictable, there are no longer any problems. And the idea of different people mutually predicting one another's behavior and acting on their prediction is, to Knight, even more absurd. Yet it is hard to understand why this should be so. Even while admitting the extremist conception of "prediction," there appears to be no more self-contradiction in the concept of man predicting himself than there is in the concept of a barber shaving himself, or of a discussion of the English language carried on in the English language. Self-prediction is certainly very difficult, and perhaps even empirically impossible; that, however, is quite a different matter.

Knight's greatest service to current method in economic analysis lies, I believe, in the vigor of his challenge. Economists and social scientists would almost certainly hamstring themselves if they took

his advice literally; yet they will become more effective for having been forced to reexamine, justify, and defend their procedures.

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GARCÍA-MORA, MANUEL R. *International Law and Asylum as a Human Right*. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1956. vi & 171 pp. \$4.50.

This work is dedicated to the idea that "states should be under the legal obligation to grant asylum to those fleeing from persecution and oppression" (p. 3). The book is largely written *de lege ferenda*, but the existing law on the matter is extracted at almost every step. Especially interesting are the chapters on asylum and common crimes, political offenses, deserters, and prisoners of war.

In the matter of extradition, the complexity of the problem is clearly revealed. Here the author is faced with an example of absolute asylum: the principle of non-extradition apart from treaty, firmly embedded in Anglo-American law. Yet the author does not agree. In his view a proper balance should be maintained between two requirements that often hopelessly conflict: prevention of aggressions upon the rights of those who are fleeing from persecution; and surrender of those who are prosecuted for genuine offenses at ordinary law. Accordingly he praises *Factor v. Laubenheimer*, U. S. Marshal, et al.—29 U. S. 276 (1933)—in which the Supreme Court held an offense to be extraditable under existing treaty arrangements between the United States and Great Britain irrespective of the fact that such offense was not punishable by the law of the State of Illinois, in which the fugitive had been taken into custody and which was, therefore, the place of refuge. The doctrine of double criminality was hereby heavily qualified. This doctrine is but a derivative of the principle that bars executive power from extraditing except under law or treaty. This principle and doctrine, though a true corollary of the classical principle *nulla poena sine lege*, an important guarantee of personal liberty fought out during centuries of constitutional development and basic to the Anglo-American system of government, is nevertheless abandoned in a book dedicated to strengthening the institution of asylum.

In the field of political offenses, the author once more disagrees with the "quite liberal" Anglo-American law, which is "satisfied with the existence of practically any connection between the common crime and the political act" (p. 79), and thus grants asylum liberally even in cases of relative political offenses, or *délits complexes*, where both

common crime and political offense are involved. As regards war crimes proper and crimes against humanity, he reaches the valid conclusion that they "afford an instructive example of offenses which cease to be political, even in the relative sense, because of the employment of methods of barbarity out of proportion to the political end in view" (p. 93). For similar reasons he would exclude subversives from the class of political offenders, but would include quislings and traitors: "the protection of the accused against the abuse of public passion is the rationale underlying the granting of asylum to those charged with assisting the enemy in time of war" (p. 91). He suggests the "complete abolition of the *attentat* clause" (p. 86)—which excludes from the class of political offenses an attempt against the life of a head of state—and certainly would grant asylum to tyrannicides. Very liberal too is the author's view on deserters. In view of such divergencies in applying the same rationale—that of public passion obscuring the ordinary course of justice—the reader will wonder whether the Anglo-American law is not sounder, and the more so as the author himself concludes that "further restrictions . . . are likely to deprive the right of asylum of all its urgency and vitality, precisely at a time when its humanitarian function is most desperately needed" (p. 93).

Perhaps the most interesting chapter in the book deals with attempts made by individuals to exercise the right of asylum as against the state of refuge in cases of fear of persecution, prosecution for a crime other than that for which extradition was granted, extradition without proceedings, and forcible recovery of the offender. Here the reader is able to understand that while asylum as a full-fledged legal right of the individual does not exist, the right of the state to grant asylum has in these situations secondary effects that may amount to legal chances quite favorable to the individual, who in this sense enjoys what have been called reflex rights. Thus the available evidence warrants the conclusion that states as a rule do not deport refugees to their country of origin if persecution is likely. Furthermore, the "doctrine of specialty," or "identity of extradition and prosecution," has produced effects so beneficial to the individual that even the author has difficulty in distinguishing them from genuine legal rights.

The practice of courts in cases of extradition without proceedings is less encouraging. But here, as in cases of forcible recovery of the offender, the author has a truly convincing argument to offer: "the matter is not that individuals are not subjects of extradition conventions—for this contention would seem quite irrelevant—but rather whether the state can legitimately abrogate individual rights without

fulfilling the requirements of the law" (p. 135). And he is able to cite isolated cases in which the courts—the Spanish Supreme Court, dealing with the doctrine of specialty, and the French Tribunal Correctionnel d'Avesnes, dealing with forcible recovery of the offender—have applied the same argument and even referred, in terms, to the "true right" of the individual, derived from legislation, to the protection involved in the granting of asylum. Thus the author reaches a conclusion very similar to Anglo-American law: that the abrogation of individual rights without fulfilling the requirements of law is the evil against which protection by granting asylum is directed, and the prohibition of such abrogation is the one sure guide in the exercise of such protection.

The author advocates inclusion in the amended Covenant on Human Rights of a provision that individuals have a human right to be granted asylum. I think he is aware that this would not solve all problems, but rather would invite "wholesale violations of the law of nations." He seems to be less aware of why "states are neither prepared nor willing

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*Reviews, Titles of New Books, Periodicals, Notes*

The *American Economic Review*, a quarterly, is the official publication of the American Economic Association and is sent to all members. The annual dues are \$6.00. Address editorial communications to Dr. Bernard F. Haley, Editor, *American Economic Review*, Stanford University, Room 220, Stanford, California; for information concerning other publications and activities of the Association, communicate with the Secretary-Treasurer, Dr. James Washington Bell, American Economic Association, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. Send for information booklet.

to accept limitations on matters which have been traditionally regarded as falling within their domestic jurisdiction" (p. 4). There are more cogent reasons why precisely the governments that *mean* to perform their international obligations think twice before undertaking quite incalculable obligations. For example, what Austria has done for the Hungarian refugees since the fall of 1956 will never be done as a matter of legal obligation, but rather as a heroic act of virtue, a shining example of human solidarity. Therefore the real problem will be solved piecemeal or by worldwide sympathy flaring up, as in the case of the Hungarian freedom fighters—for the real problem is not the handful of cases involving high personalities to whom "political asylum" in the proper sense is granted. The mass of refugees are neither political offenders nor common criminals. They seem to fall outside the scope of a book to which these thousands and millions give a sense of urgency.

BARNA HORVATH

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
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